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ABSTRACT
United States’ foreign policy during the Haitian Revolution demands significant 
attention from historians because it was one of the first events—albeit an event that was 
played out over thirteen years and three presidential administrations—that illustrated the 
themes that would predominate nineteenth-century American diplomacy. George 
Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson each pursued these themes—protection 
of national security, maintenance of freedom of action, expansion of commerce, and 
pursuit of territorial empire—with remarkable consistency. Although the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Paris in 1781 and 1782 also highlighted several of these themes, it was not 
until the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, which was a direct offshoot of events in Haiti, 
that they became near dogma for American policymakers.
Furthermore, because American foreign policy during the Haitian Revolution 
takes place within several important historical contexts, the rivalry with Great Britain, the 
Quasi-War with France, and the Napoleonic Wars, American policymakers were forced 
to abandon their Revolutionary War idealist isolationism that forbid involvement in 
European affairs. If the United States was to defend its national interests, it would have 
to engage in the power politics so feared by the revolutionaries as unbecoming of a 
republican government. Although the breakdown of this idealism began with the 
realization of the need for a Franco-American alliance during the Revolutionary War, the 
alliance was short-lived and the possibility for retrenchment after the war was significant. 
The events of the Haitian Revolution, again culminating in the purchase of Louisiana, 
ensured that the United States could neither retrench inside its borders nor simply use 
commerce as its only means to externally promote security, republicanism, and territorial 
expansion.
This study examines the specific policies of these three presidential 
administrations. Despite their consistency, each administration’s policies concerning the 
Haitian Revolution set important yet distinctive diplomatic precedents. First, George 
Washington laid out the strategic blueprints for his successors. As early as 1794, 
Washington committed the United States to protecting its significant commercial interests 
with Saint Domingue, the French name for the island now called Haiti. Washington’s 
strategy, largely guided by Alexander Hamilton, was to promote French sovereignty 
while at the same time exploit the Haitian Revolution’s commercial opportunities by 
trading with (and aiding) all sides. Adams and Jefferson would, using different tactics, 
largely adopt Washington’s strategy of promoting the political status quo on the island 
while exploiting the opportunities offered by the revolution. Second, John Adams took 
this policy even farther by authorizing the first military intervention in Latin America and 
the first military intervention in a foreign revolution in United States’ history. Third, 
with the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson ended American diplomatic involvement 
in the Haitian Revolution with the most significant precedent of all—the United States 
first territorial acquisition after the Treaty of Paris. Although the tactics of each 
administration differed significantly, they each pursued clearly defined national interests. 
However, uncontrollable geopolitical circumstances—the French Revolution, British 
ambitions in the Caribbean, and Napoleon’s desires for a restored New World Empire— 
forced Washington, Adams, and Jefferson to each devise their own solutions.
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UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION: 
A Story of Continuity, Power Politics, and the Lure of Empire in the Early Republic
Introduction
Four days after declaring independence, the Continental Congress appointed a 
five-man committee to prepare a treaty to present to the French. Congress knew that 
declaring independence was only the first step in securing foreign support for the war 
against England. The Continental Congress knew that it must also offer some sort of 
treaty of alliance to France. However, the definition of such an alliance was highly 
controversial among the representatives. Should the newly formed United States offer a 
full treaty of political alliance or simply a treaty of commerce and friendship? The nature 
of the colonies’ and now the United States’ relationships with other nations had been 
debated since independence was first whispered. Thomas Paine in Common Sense wrote, 
“As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connection with any part 
of it. It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions.”1 The 
members of the treaty committee ultimately agreed, and John Adams drafted the Model 
Treaty. Like Paine and many other American revolutionaries, Adams did not want 
entangling political commitments. Following the Seven Years’ War, many American 
colonists had become resentful of what they felt was their unnecessary involvement in 
European wars. As England began to tax its colonies more heavily after 1763, many 
Americans became convinced that such oppression would not occur if they broke their 
imperial ties to England. In one of his political treatises, Benjamin Franklin wrote in the 
first person with “I” being America and “you” being England, “you have quarrelled with 
all Europe, and drawn me into all your Broils. . . .  I have no natural Cause of Difference 
with France, Spain or Holland, and yet by turns I have join’d with you in Wars against all
2
3of them.” What had caused them grief in their colonial days, Adams reasoned, would be 
detrimental to the prosperity and security of the new nation.
Adams’ Model Treaty was largely a commercial treaty that would allow 
American ships and goods free and unlimited access to French ports, while the French 
would pour military supplies into the American war effort. The treaty also defined the 
rights of neutral shippers during wartime. Adams believed that the United States, as a 
proclaimed neutral, should have the right to carry out commerce with belligerents on any 
side of a war. Adams was thinking less about the war with England and more towards 
the United States’ future as a potential commercial power. Hence, the Model Treaty
o
began the United States’ historical policy of “freedom of the seas.”
Although Adams did not get his wish and the United States signed a formal treaty 
of political alliance with France to ensure French support, the alliance was effective only 
for five years and formally abrogated after twenty years. Moreover, Adams, along with 
fellow peace commissioners John Jay and Benjamin Franklin, personally accelerated the 
breakdown of the Franco-American alliance in 1782 when he helped to negotiate a 
separate peace treaty with England even though the terms of the alliance with France 
forbade one party from concluding a peace treaty without the other. Franklin, Jay, and 
Adams hinted to the English that they would accept a separate treaty without the French 
if England would grant complete independence, generous boundaries, and provisions for 
the resumption of trade. The Model Treaty established an ideal to which American 
foreign policymakers would aspire well into the twentieth century, and the separate peace 
negotiations with England evidenced American policy makers’ determination to maintain
4the freedom of action to pursue the young nation’s interests: independence, commerce, 
and territorial expansion.
The idealism, and one might say naivete, of the Model Treaty gave way to the 
realpolitik of the Treaty of Paris. Nevertheless, both treaties confirmed that the guiding 
principle of American foreign policy would be freedom of action to pursue national 
interests. This principle would be tested by an event completely unforeseen when Adams 
drafted the Model Treaty in 1776 or upon the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783. The 
Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), a slave revolt turned war for independence, severely 
tested the will of three presidential administrations, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson. 
Each administration would attempt to reconcile its own ideological and political 
convictions and American “traditional” foreign policy with circumstances presented by 
the revolution in order to expand commerce, ensure national security, and eventually, 
acquire territory.
United States foreign policy during the Haitian Revolution was a battle against 
European colonialism, the racist fears of American policy makers, and those who would 
restrict American freedom of action. However, the Haitian Revolution also provided 
American policymakers the opportunity to further America’s commercial and territorial 
aspirations of empire. According to the philosophy of the American revolutionaries, 
commerce was more than just a means to achieve fiscal prosperity, as historian Bradford 
Perkins states, “mutually profitable commerce would lubricate the machinery of peace.”4 
Commerce was the vehicle that would carry European gold to America’s coffers and 
American republicanism to Europe’s oppressed. Therefore, treaties of commerce and a 
liberal definition of neutral rights were essential not only to the United States’ war effort,
5but to its future and the future of republicanism across the globe. America was to bring 
the gospel of republicanism to the world with its ships of goods and grain.5 Washington, 
Adams, and Jefferson would each relentlessly seek to maintain and expand the lucrative 
trade with Saint Domingue (the French name for half of the island of Hispaniola that is 
now Haiti).
To achieve these goals, the United States would have to play the game of 
traditional European power politics, eschewing at least temporarily its goal of staying out 
of European power struggles. Diplomatic relations during the Haitian Revolution did not 
exist inside a vacuum, but rather American relations with Saint Domingue existed inside 
the contexts of the French Revolution, the American Quasi-War with France, the 
American desire for commercial and territorial expansion, and the ever-present rivalry 
with England. Washington, and especially Adams and Jefferson, found it impossible to 
secure American interests without involving themselves in what could have been seen as 
a European affair—the overthrow of French control from Saint Domingue and the 
eventual effort of Napoleon to reconquer the island. Furthermore, by the end of the 
1790s, Saint Domingue was a proxy battleground for the British against the French, all of 
which threatened the United States’ enormously profitable commercial relationship with 
the island. To combat that threat, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson would engage in 
the realpolitik that Adams himself so tried to avoid in the Model Treaty yet succeeded so 
well with in the Treaty of Paris.
Although there were many specific differences in policy between the three 
American administrations in this study, they each displayed two consistent policy strands. 
Each sought to maintain the commercial statue quo with Saint Domingue—meaning
6supporting nominal but loose French control over the island— and to protect American 
national security at the expense of a European power. American foreign policy during 
the Haitian Revolution changed over time to adjust for uncontrollable circumstances, but 
the United State’s commitment to trade, as illustrated by the Model Treaty, never 
wavered. In fact, as opportunities presented themselves during the course of the 
revolution, American foreign policymakers, as Samuel Flagg Bemis stated, turned 
“Europe’s distress” into “American advantage.” The most spectacular “advantage” was 
Jefferson’s doubling of the size of the country with the Louisiana Purchase, which was a 
direct result of events in Saint Domingue. While in pursuit of these goals, Washington, 
Adams, and Jefferson established several remarkable precedents in the conduct of 
American foreign policy. Washington began the policy of supporting the status quo in 
Saint Domingue to protect American trade. Adams authorized the first use of American 
military intervention in a foreign conflict in the history of the United States. And 
Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana went outside a strict constitutionalist interpretation to 
set a precedent for American territorial expansion. Moreover, the efforts of all three 
influenced the creation of the first black republic composed of mostly former slaves. 
James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1801, "The situation and destiny of that 
Island is in several points of view deeply interesting to the United States."6 The destiny 
of Haiti was indeed linked with the United States, and American foreign policy during 
the Haitian Revolution would help to determine the course of both nations’ futures far 
more than any policymaker involved thought possible.
Chapter I: The Washington Administration
Haiti's Significance to the World and the Beginnings of Revolution
In 1789, the colony of Saint Domingue was the diamond in France’s West Indian 
empire. Saint Domingue was the world's largest producer of sugar and coffee, producing 
more sugar than all of the British West Indian islands combined. It was the wealthiest 
and most productive slave colony in the Caribbean. This small island provided more 
wealth for France than the entire region of Louisiana ever did. Its vast wealth made the 
colony the crown jewel of the eighteenth-century Caribbean. France obviously placed 
Saint Domingue high on its colonial priority list. However, the ancien regime never 
played an overly active role in governing the small colony, preferring to allow the local 
planter aristocracy to maintain tight control over their plantations. As long as the coffee, 
sugar, and the gold from the sale of those goods kept flowing to France, the government 
was content to leave Saint Domingue alone. Nevertheless, it was very wary if any other 
power tried to encroach upon its colonial and commercial rights in Saint Domingue.
The country that tried and succeeded the most in doing so was the young United 
States. The American colonies began trading with Saint Domingue as early as 1717.8 
New England used Saint Domingue as a source of cheap molasses and as a market for 
refuse fish, which the planters used to feed slaves in the colony. Other products like iron, 
flour, cattle, and house frames flowed from the United States to Saint Domingue.9 The 
colony's cash-crop agricultural economy gave the island much gold but little ability to 
produce all its own food and manufactured goods. Therefore, the planters had
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tremendous purchasing power, but they had to purchase most of what they wanted from 
outside the colony. The United States was the most willing and able source of trade. 
France, of course, resented the fact that the gold revenues from sugar and coffee sales 
were going toward purchasing goods from the United States. France's lack of ability to 
be the primary supplier and granary of Saint Domingue continually hampered French 
policy during the upcoming revolution on the island. American merchants, primarily 
from New England, were more than happy to exploit France's inability to supply her own 
colony. These merchants coveted their trade with the island and often useddheir political 
connections in the Federalist Party to ensure its continuation and protection.
America's trade with Saint Domingue is one of the first examples of American 
diplomacy seeking to expand and protect a commercial empire in search of foreign 
markets. As historian Thomas Ott wrote in his work, The Haitian Revolution (1973), 
'The desire of the United States to maintain this rich trade was a primary consideration in 
its policy toward the Haitian Revolution."10 In 1790, trade with Saint Domingue 
amounted to 2.2 million dollars, approximately eleven percent of the United States’ total 
exports.11 By comparison, the United States’ largest trading partner in 1790, Great 
Britain, received 7 million dollars in American exports, or thirty five percent of all 
exports. However, France, despite its treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United 
States, received less than 1 million dollars in American good. Over thirty-one percent of 
all American exports with a non-European destination were headed for Saint Domingue 
in 1790.12 In 1791 alone, more than 500 ships from the United States engaged in trade 
with Saint Domingue.13 In a highly export-dependent economy, The United States’ trade 
with Saint Domingue was a significant factor in the nation’s economic health.
9Most members of the island’s elite knew that without the agricultural goods from 
the United States, the colony could never feed itself and still produce the copious 
amounts of sugar and coffee needed to maintain the island's high income. The French 
felt that this encroachment of American commercial influence violated France’s 
mercantilist rights and reduced Saint Domingue's value to the mother country. However, 
the merchants and planters of Saint Domingue were perfectly aware of the importance of 
American trade to the colony's prosperity. In early 1790, Le Comte Duchillan, governor 
of Saint Domingue, wanted all restrictions lifted for American shipping, but French 
merchants successfully prevented this move toward free trade.14 Despite the failure of 
this measure, trade between Saint Domingue and the United States became increasingly 
more liberalized after American independence. Saint Domingue and France had to 
accept the necessity of liberalizing trade because of the island's dependence on the United 
States.
France and the United States were hardly the only powers interested in "The 
Jewel of the Antilles." A pot of gold as rich as Saint Domingue had more than its share 
of jealous onlookers, ready to snatch up any of the colony's over-flowing wealth. Spain, 
which owned Santo Domingo on other half of Hispaniola, had always coveted the entire 
island. Britain had an envious eye on Saint Domingue since 1655. A half-century later 
in 1706 during the War of Spanish Succession, Britain had tried to force the French from 
Saint Domingue. The British again tried to invade the island in 1748, capturing only a 
small part of the island that was soon retaken by the French.15 The fact that the French 
had the wealthiest colony in the West Indies, even more so than Cuba, was an affront to 
British pride and a challenge to British supremacy. Despite their failure to control the
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island, the British continually used the threat of blockading and invading Saint Domingue 
as an effective diplomatic lever throughout the eighteenth century. Britain could not 
ignore that Saint Domingue provided the greatest competition to its own sugar islands in 
the West Indies. The necessities of competition forced Great Britain to always keep an 
eye on events in Saint Domingue.
Nevertheless, the great source of Saint Domingue's wealth was neither sugar, 
coffee, nor trade—it was slaves. By 1787, there were 408,000 slaves in the colony, and 
they were rapidly increasing. Slavery in Saint Domingue, like other West Indian sugar 
colonies, was extremely harsh. The death rate was much higher for slaves in Saint 
Domingue than for slaves in the United States. To offset this rapid loss of slave property, 
a brisk slave trade kept up the inflow of African-born slaves at a much higher rate than 
the United States. The primary owners of slaves were the French white planters. With a 
population around 24,000 in 1787, the whites were by far the wealthiest class in Saint 
Domingue. Not all whites were planters, however. The highest levels of status and 
power belonged to the French-born aristocrats in administrative and bureaucratic 
positions. They were the only real competition for the native-born white planter, or 
grand blanc. If there was a middle class in Saint Domingue, it was composed of the 
native mulatto population, numbered around 20,000 in 1787, called the gens de couleur, 
and the white artisans, overseers, and merchants, called the petits blancs. Mulattos— 
legally any person of African descent who could also prove partial European descent— 
held many of the same rights as whites. Most importantly, Mulattos could own property. 
Although they held a lower legal and social status, many of the laws discriminating 
against persons of mixed blood were disregarded and ignored. Some mulattos were slave
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owners themselves and treated their slaves with equal severity. Slave holding was the 
path to riches in Saint Domingue, and many mulattos were determined to make the racist 
doctrines of the day work in their favor. The mulattos composed most of the military and 
were often sent to France for education and training. Out of this class arose many of the 
political and military leaders of the Haitian Revolution.16
By 1789, tension between all classes had reached new heights. A year earlier, the 
society of Les Amis des Noirs, an organization devoted to establishing full mulatto rights 
and abolishing slavery, was founded in France. Using them military, planters tightened 
their control over slavery and mulatto rights were further reduced. Wealthy mulattos, 
facing increased discrimination despite their wealth, petitioned the recently called 
Estates-General in May for full rights of citizenship. In December, their petition was 
declined and harassment of mulattos in Saint Domingue intensified. Class hatred became 
rampant, and the petit blanc resentment of wealthy mulattos further enflamed the 
growing crisis. Acts of violence soon broke out, and reports, if not proof, of horrific 
atrocities became common. The mulattos once again submitted a petition to the National 
Assembly for full rights, which was again denied on December 3. Mulattos continued to 
make speeches and protest their treatment, arousing much public sentiment among 
blacks. The Revolution in France had spread to Saint Domingue.17
For two years, mulattos and whites battled for control of the colony. On March 8, 
1790, the National Assembly in France declared that the colonies had control over their 
own affairs, thereby washing their hands of burgeoning revolution in Saint Domingue. 
The responsibility fell on the island’s Colonial Assembly. However, in 1791, the nature 
of the conflict in Saint Domingue would take a radical turn that forced France to rethink
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its policy. This shift was so profound, that its ramifications would be studied and 
contemplated by the world's major powers for the next century. Very late on the night of 
August 22, 1791, a white-hating voodoo priest and fugitive slave from Jamaica, a man 
known only as Boukmann, rallied slaves from several plantations on the Plaine du Nord. 
Ransacking their plantations and shooting their overseers, the slaves swept through the 
countryside, gathering strength and power as the number of slaves in revolt swelled to
100,000 in the North Province. The Revolution was now also a slave revolt. In 1794, the
1 RFrench National Assembly issued a decree of emancipation for the French colonies. 
The slave revolt had succeeded, but the Revolution was far from over.
Reaction to the Revolution: 1791-1795
Emboldened by the spirit and rhetoric of the French Revolution, the black slaves 
and the mulattos eventually joined forces against the whites. They believed liberty, 
equality, and fraternity belonged to them as much as it did the French. Over the next few 
years a bloody, atrocity filled war ravaged Saint Domingue. Slogans such as "death to all 
whites" predominated throughout. Unlike the American and French Revolutions, the 
Haitian Revolution was as much a racial struggle as it was an economic, political, or 
social one. The French National Assembly could no longer ignore the dramatic and 
terrible events in their colony. In 1792, The National Assembly sent a French battalion 
of troops under General Le Salle to Saint Domingue. These troops, ardent with 
revolutionary fervor, had hats and banners that read "Live Free or Die." General Le Salle 
ordered his troops to remove or cover up the slogan, fearing the implications if the slaves
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or mulattos (who would tell the slaves what it said since most slaves could not read) saw 
such inflammatory rhetoric.19
The British were also alarmed by the revolt in Saint Domingue. Not having yet 
abolished the slave trade, Britain's first reaction was to send aid to the white planters. 
They were concerned that the slave revolt might spread to Jamaica and other English 
colonies, and they would lose their commerce. In 1791, Governor Effingham of Jamaica 
sent military aid and supplies to the planters in Saint Domingue. Britain wanted
90desperately to contain the ideology of the Haitian Revolution.
The United States was also extremely concerned about the events in Saint 
Domingue. Like the French National Assembly, the United States did not become overly 
concerned with the revolution in Saint Domingue until it transformed into a slave revolt. 
A slave revolt involving near a half million slaves not very far from the continent had 
potentially enormous consequences for the slave holding United States. However, the 
multitude of reactions to the Haitian Revolution, especially at this early stage can be 
better understood by examining the state of slavery in the United States in the early 
1790s. In 1791, slavery was arguably on the decline. All states north of Maryland had 
made provisions for emancipation, and the Federal government had forbidden slavery in 
the Northwest Territory. Eli Whitney did not patent his cotton gin until 1793, and slavery 
had not yet become the divisive issue it would be in the nineteenth century. However,
700,000 slaves resided in the United States, which had a total population at this time 
around 3 million. These slaves still represented an enormous economic investment. 
Although the argument that slavery was a benevolent institution would not appear until 
the next century, the racial doctrines of the 1790s still held that a slave revolt would be a
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threat to liberty itself.21 Slavery was the “measuring rod” of freedom. In the context of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Americans increasingly measured freedom 
against the debasement of black slavery. In other words, to be free meant not to be a 
slave. Hence, the elimination of slavery would have required an utterly new definition of 
freedom that would have challenged nearly all the racial, social, and gendered prejudices
99of the time. Slavery as an institution was not defended by fire-eating pro-slavery 
advocates of a Slave Power, but by policymakers who felt that a slave revolt would lead 
to the loss of white liberty at the hands of slaves, just like in Saint Domingue.
Early American reactions to the revolt were hence varied and ambiguous. George 
Washington referred to the revolt as "the unfortunate insurrection of negroes" in a letter 
to the French Minister to the United States, Jean Baptiste de Temant, in October 1791. 
Southern newspapers cried out in horror using rhetoric that would become familiar to the 
Civil War generation. Nathaniel Russell wrote to Ralph Izard, a United States Senator 
from South Carolina, in 1794, "I hope some effective measures will be adopted to prevent 
any evil consequences from that diabolical decree of the national convention which 
emancipates all the slaves in the french (sic) colonies, a circumstance the most alarming 
that could happen to this country."23 Historian James Sidbury, in his article "Saint 
Domingue in Virginia: Ideology, Local Meanings, and Resistance to Slavery, 1790- 
1800," stated that Virginians were "nonplussed" by the revolt and the subsequent 
emancipation. They could not understand how the French planters could lose control or 
how the slaves found a way to organize themselves. Others thought it was simply 
abominable.24 Several states, such as Georgia and Izard's own South Carolina, even 
temporarily stopped importing slaves from the West Indies, fearing some slaves
15
"infected" with the spirit of revolt from Saint Domingue might spread their dreaded 
disease.25
White Americans were not the only people disturbed by the revolt in Saint 
Domingue. According to Peggy Liss, “The reverberation in Spanish colonies of the 
French Revolution in Saint Domingue in 1792 contributed not only to the scarcity of
9 f \foodstuffs but also to racial tension and official headache.” Spanish authorities felt the 
largest shockwaves in the Spanish Caribbean, New Spain, and Brazil. Although Spanish 
officials discovered two minor conspiracies in Guatemala in 1794, the government 
became increasing afraid of the “large numbers” of emigres and refugees from Saint 
Domingue. In a 1795 revolt in Coro, on the Venezuelan coast, several thousand black 
and part black slaves killed whites.27
The United States developed two primary strains of policy in reaction to the 
events in Saint Domingue. The first strain was in deference to the interests of southern 
slave owners and those who feared the "evil consequences" from a general slave uprising 
in the United States. However, fears of slave revolts were not strictly a southern 
phenomenon, as many in the northern states also were wary of Saint Domingue's 
implications. The specifics of this line of American policy began to develop when 
representatives from Saint Domingue's Colonial Assembly visited the American 
government in Philadelphia in 1791. The French National Assembly ordered the 
Colonial Assembly of Saint Domingue to send agents to the United States to seek 
assistance from the colony's other major trading partner. The French assumed that the 
United States, even more so than Britain, would be more than happy to contain and 
destroy the dangerous revolt in Saint Domingue. After all, France and the United States
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were still close allies, and a certain spirit of cooperation existed between the two nations. 
Ironically, American fears of the Haitian Revolution spreading to other slave colonies 
would eventually bring the United States and Great Britain, not France, closer together in 
1796.
In late 1791, Jean Baptiste de Temant, the French Minister to the United States, 
approached President Washington asking for financial aid to relieve the French planters 
and for supplies to put down the revolt. De Temant also hinted that France would be 
willing to accept direct American military intervention as well. Washington refused to 
engage militarily, but in a letter to de Temant in September, Washington authorized the 
first $40,000 of an eventual sum of near $725,000 that would go towards purchasing 
materiel, arms, and supplies for the French planters in Saint Domingue. He clearly 
elucidated the American position towards these early stages of the Haitian Revolution, "I 
am happy in the opportunity of testifying how well disposed the United States are to 
render every aid in their power to our good friends and allies, the French, to quell 'the 
alarming insurrection of the Negroes in Hispanola,' and of the ready disposition of the 
executive authority to effect it."28 Spurred on by Alexander Hamilton, Washington 
planned to use his discretionary powers as President to take a lead role in foreign policy 
towards Saint Domingue. Thomas Jefferson, Washington's Secretary of State, was also 
anxious to get supplies and aid to the planters and put down the slave revolt. The 
Francophilic Jefferson saw this aid as an opportunity to bind the two nations even closer. 
Jefferson wrote de Ternant in November of 1792 that by aiding France in Saint 
Domingue the United States "could not better evidence our friendship."29 Neither 
Washington, Jefferson, nor Hamilton, the three people who most controlled U.S. foreign
17
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policy in the early 1790s, was "a crusader in behalf of slavery." While each of their 
specific areas of concern differed, each thought they were pursuing the national interest. 
However, Washington and Jefferson owned slaves themselves, and all three, especially 
Jefferson, were still sensitive to the interests of slave owners.
The second strain of foreign policy concerning Saint Domingue aimed at 
protecting, maintaining, and increasing the United States' vast trade with the colony. As 
previously mentioned, eleven-percent of all American overseas trade was with Saint 
Domingue. The conflict on the island could potentially disrupt the rich trade, however, it 
also opened up new opportunities for American merchants. War meant that the demand 
for goods would skyrocket and the trading would be even more lucrative. Armies needed 
to be fed, and the United States was the most available source of food. Moreover, 
American merchants, mostly from New England, had few qualms about with whom they 
traded. Gold from the mulattos or blacks was equally as valuable as gold from the 
planters. These merchants often stretched French neutral shipping laws beyond their 
intended boundaries. Initially, the merchants wanted to maintain "business as usual." 
However, the circumstances of war quickly forced them to adopt different tactics. 
Hamilton realized that the revolt in Saint Domingue could open up new opportunities to 
extract more trade concessions from France. If France needed American aid, it would 
have to accept such aid on American terms.
Moreover, Hamilton received numerous letters from New England merchants 
complaining of French abuses.31 He wanted to use the carrot of American aid to goad 
France into accepting further trade concessions. Gouvemeur Morris, the new minister to 
France, wrote Jefferson in January 1792 that his "most important (duty) is the patronage
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of our commerce, and the extension of the privileges, both in France and her colonies, but 
most especially in the latter."32 Undoubtedly, Hamilton knew that any further opening of 
trade with Saint Domingue would result in more trade with the revolting blacks and 
mulattos as well as with the beleaguered planters. However, this fact made little 
difference to the New England merchants, who were mostly Federalists and largely 
indifferent to the racial and social implications of their profiteering, unlike their 
Jeffersonian compatriots. Jeffersonians Republicans, who in 1792 were starting to form a 
collective identity, were much more likely to be slave owners and agrarian minded. To 
the Jeffersonians, trading with rebelling slaves was antithetical to natural law because it 
violated the “natural” racial order. Furthermore, it was immoral and threatened their 
position as slave owners.
Southern slaveholders were indeed well aware of their northern brethren's actions. 
Most of the southern states, especially South Carolina, called for a total trade embargo 
with Saint Domingue or for only limited trade using French ships. Southerners, 
especially the Jeffersonian Republicans, were incensed that the greed of Northern 
Federalist merchants could compromise their liberties. The formation of the first French 
Republic in 1793 further complicated the issue. Hamilton argued that the United States' 
commercial and political treaties were now void and that the United States could ignore 
the restrictions of trade with the French colonies stipulated in the treaty. Unregulated 
trade would more easily allow supplies and food to reach all warring parties in Saint 
Domingue. Jefferson did not believe in advocating an embargo or in severely restricting 
trade. Nevertheless, he believed all trade with Saint Domingue should exist within the 
current relationship between France and the United States. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson
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did not want to abrogate the treaties with France and believed that the establishment of a 
Republic in France only enhanced the relationship between the two nations. Jefferson 
thought that the formation of the Republic in 1793 "as a link which binds still closer [the] 
interests and affections" of the United States and France. On December 30, 1792, 
Jefferson wrote to Gouvemeur Morris in France concerning the possibility of abrogating 
the treaties with France:
We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that 
every one may govern itself under whatever forms it please, and change their forms at its own 
will, and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks 
proper, whether King, convention, assembly, committee, President, or whatever else it may chuse 
(sic). The will o f the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded,34
Jefferson considered these treaties to be with the nation and not with the specific
government, as Hamilton believed. It was the right of France to depend on its
relationship with the United States. Not surprisingly, Jefferson was only referring to
France in this letter. Jefferson was ignorant of the ironies of such a statement in the
context of the Haitian Revolution. For the remainder of the decade, Jefferson would
lobby to suppress “the will of the nation” in Haiti. The freedom to express such a will
belonged to free white men, not slaves in revolt. For the rest of Washington's
administration, Jefferson continued to fight trade excesses in Saint Domingue and for
further aid to France.
Some southerners and Republicans saw the Washington administration's policy of
aiding France while enhancing trade to be conflicting goals. Indeed some historians have
agreed with them. Thomas Ott wrote that these two strains of policy were contradictory,
and that the policy of promoting trade usually won out because of the influence of
Hamilton and the Federalist control of the government. Although Hamilton obviously
was more partial to the interests of the New England merchants and Jefferson was more
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sensitive to the interests of the south and slave owners, Washington played his usual role 
of compromising between the two positions. The Washington administration most likely 
saw these two policy goals as harmonious. The United States wanted to maintain the 
French presence in Saint Domingue, fearing either that the British would fill the void left 
by France and the United States would then lose the trade with the island, or that a loss of 
French control would result in a further expanding slave revolt. In the early 1790s, 
aiding the French to put down the Revolution was the United States' best opportunity to 
control the effects of the slave revolt and maintain commercial hegemony over the island. 
After all, the United States had profited immensely when France had controlled the 
island. Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton saw little reason why the country would not 
profit in the future if the French controlled the island. Jefferson stated the 
administration's opinion in 1795, "France enjoys the sovereignty over them (Saint 
Domingue) and we, the profit from them."36 France having "sovereignty" meant that they 
had the political and moral responsibility for controlling the slaves. The United States 
simply reaped the economic benefits.
The administration's task was further complicated by the entrance of hundreds of 
white refuge planters from Saint Domingue into the United States. Fleeing from the 
revolting hordes, these emigres posed numerous problems for the state and federal 
governments. Approximately 5000 such emigres entered the United States by 1793, a
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number that would mushroom to 20,000 by 1797. Most of these refugees were wealthy 
planters whose plantations were threatened by the conflict in their homeland. These 
refugees had a two-fold impact on American policy. Naturally, most had aristocratic and 
royalist leanings and were disdainful of the French Revolution. Therefore, they quickly
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became involved in the Federalist Party, which held an antipathy toward Republican 
France and a greater toleration of monarchial feelings. These were the very people aware 
that Saint Domingue's prosperity depended on trade with the United States. Their 
presence strengthened the Federalist Party and gave it a new impetus to increase trade 
with Saint Domingue.
However, the emigres carried with them two important things that would feed the 
fears of slave revolt—their horrifying tales of persecution at the hands of the revolting 
slaves and the planters' slaves themselves. The refugees' stories, certainly overly 
sensationalized, spread quickly throughout the country. Testimony of blacks raping all 
white women and murdering all white men enflamed the worst fears of slave owners and 
even non-slaveholders who shared their racist ideology. Many Americans felt that events 
in Saint Domingue confirmed their suspicious about blacks: that left to their own devices, 
blacks would intrinsically murder all whites and were unfit for freedom. Southerners up 
until the Civil War would promulgate these conclusions. The Haitian Revolution became 
the ultimate damning evidence against emancipation.
Furthermore, many whites feared that the slaves the French emigres brought with 
them would "infect" the American slaves with ideas of revolt and revolution. Some
10,000 slaves from Saint Domingue entered the United States in the early 1790s, and 
many southern states passed restrictions or outright bans on the importation of slaves 
from the West Indies.38 Indeed there were numerous connections between slave revolts in 
the United States and the Haitian Revolution. As early as 1791, a small insurrection in 
Louisiana was tied to events in Saint Domingue.39 In 1792, a slave conspiracy was 
discovered in Richmond, Virginia that had been influenced at least partially by the
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Haitian Revolution. In 1793, other Virginians discovered the existence of a vast network 
of "Secret Keepers," a secret slave network designed to transmit and coordinate plans of 
insurrection, many of whom had come from Saint Domingue.40 Free blacks and slaves 
no doubt heard the stories of the Revolution from these newly imported slaves. They also 
heard their white masters discussing the "tragedy" of Saint Domingue as printed in the 
local newspapers. Some American blacks also witnessed it first hand. One of the few 
occupations open to free blacks was the merchant marine. In 1791 alone, five hundred to 
six hundred ships visited Saint Domingue from the United States totaling about five 
thousand sailors. Approximately fifteen percent of all sailors were black, which meant 
around seven-hundred-fifty blacks could have visited the island per year. Denmark 
Vesey was himself a sailor and could not have failed to be inspired by the Haitian 
example several decades later 41
Several historians have argued that the revolt in Saint Domingue caused a shift in 
the ideology of slave rebellions. Slavery historians David Geggus and Eugene D. 
Genovese have argued that after the early 1790s "slaves increasingly aimed not at 
secession from the dominant society but at joining it on equal terms."42 The idea of freed 
black on "equal terms" was terrifying to the slave holding whites. All of the predominant 
emancipation schemes of the day, such as those of Jefferson, called for all of the freed 
slaves to leave white society, by either returning to Africa or migrating to Central and 
South America. The goal of a slave revolt was now inclusion, which is what most 
whites, slaveholding and non-slaveholding, feared the most.
Jefferson, as Washington's Secretary of State, was deeply concerned on how to 
handle the refugee planters and contain the spread of slave revolt. He was tom between
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his empathy for the emigre's plight, his anti-royalist leanings, and his fear of a slave 
revolt. Most of the emigres, having fled Saint Domingue quickly and without most of 
their wealth, arrived in the United States quite destitute. They sought aid from the federal 
government to allow them to live until their possessions could be recovered from their 
homes and plantations. Jefferson believed that it was unconstitutional for the federal 
government to give direct aid to private individuals and that the state governments were 
responsible for providing relief. Moreover, Jefferson had difficulty accepting that 
aristocratic royalists were deserving of government aid. Nevertheless, his sympathy for 
their plight eventually won over. He wrote to James Monroe in 1793, "The situation of 
the St. Domingo fugitives (aristocrats as they are) calls aloud for pity and charity. Never 
was so deep a tragedy presented to the feelings of man."43 Undoubtedly, Jefferson would 
have wanted similar sympathy should he experience a threatening slave rebellion. For a 
man that had thought British oppressions and tyranny so great as to advocate revolution 
two decades earlier, to say that he had never seen "so deep a tragedy" as the conflict in 
Saint Domingue was a momentous expression. Jefferson continued to express to Monroe 
his serious concern at what had occurred in Saint Domingue and could occur in the 
United States:
I become daily more and more convinced that all the West India Islands will remain in the hands 
of the people of colour and a total expulsion of the whites sooner or later take place. It is high 
time we should foresee the bloody scenes which our children certainly and possible ourselves 
(south o f the Potomac) have to wade through, and try to avert them.44
If Jefferson was so sure that the Haitian Revolution would lead to a similar bloody 
revolt in the United States, why did the Washington administration pursue a non­
interventionist policy in the early 1790s and not take more steps to "avert" and contain 
the revolution in Saint Domingue? Although by 1795 the United States provided France
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with over $700,000 in aid, which was credited to the war debt with France, more 
American ships than ever traded in Saint Domingue. This trade kept all sides of the 
Haitian Revolution fed and supplied. A trade embargo or at least trade only through 
French merchants arguably would have done more to break the rebelling blacks and 
mulattos than any amount of intervention or aid to France. If Jefferson's slave rebellion 
"domino theory" was so pervasive, as it appeared to be in southern newspapers and in the 
rhetoric of southern politicians, why did the Washington administration not pursue a 
more direct policy of containment? The administration chose to be relatively non­
interventionist because a more activist policy would have sacrificed other primary policy 
goals. Although Jefferson was Secretary of State and had definite fears of a slave revolt, 
he was not the President. Furthermore, he resigned his position in 1793, feeling that he 
had lost the ear of the president. Washington's most influential advisor was arguably 
Hamilton, and Jefferson’s departure from the cabinet increased Hamilton’s influence. In 
the early 1790s, the new nation was hardly on sound economic footing and needed to 
exploit foreign markets to sell its surplus agricultural production. For Hamilton, who had 
worked a good part of his life to abolish slavery in his home state of New York, to 
sacrifice this rich trade with Saint Domingue in order assuage irrational fears of a slave 
revolt was a direct affront to his policy vision. War in the colony was an opportunity for 
the United States to enhance trade even further. Of course, unlike Jefferson, he did not 
mind that France was incensed at this American audacity as well. Hamilton and 
Jefferson agreed, however, that if the United States would not trade with Saint 
Domingue, the British would assume America's position as the colony's primary trading
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partner. Neither France nor the United States wanted Britain to get its claws of empire 
into Saint Domingue. Once there, they would be very difficult to remove.
Despite Hamilton's anti-French tendencies, the administration officially took a 
pro-France position. The revolt in Saint Domingue provided the first opportunity for the 
United States to uphold its responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty of Alliance with 
France. The national government did give France significant aid, and the various state 
legislatures passed bills providing aid for the refugee planters. The United States' official 
policy in the early 1790s was no doubt in France's favor. The French forces in Saint 
Domingue still received the bulk of American trade. The only question being debated 
was why did the administration not do more to aid France and destroy the rebellion. 
Even though the rhetoric of southern slaveholders was often outlandish in regards to the 
threat posed by the rebelling slaves in Saint Domingue, there was increasing evidence 
that the Haitian Revolution was influencing American slaves. Nevertheless, other than 
several states banning the importation of slaves from Saint Domingue, the United States 
government took little action to directly contain the "infection" of slave rebellion. The 
Washington administration believed that its policy of supporting French sovereignty in 
Saint Domingue was the best strategy to contain the Haitian Revolution and to maintain 
America's profitable trade relationship with the island. Hamilton considered the 
American trade with both sides of the Revolution a fortuitous opportunity to expand 
American commerce; Jefferson thought it a betrayal of France and a threat to slave 
owners. France had less than a decade earlier helped the United States to win its 
independence. To ignore France's requests for aid was unthinkable. Just as Hamilton 
wanted to use the conflict in Saint Domingue to expand trade, Jefferson fully planned to
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exploit the Haitian Revolution as an opportunity to strengthen the Franco-American 
Alliance. In 1792 and 1793, the horrors of the Reign of Terror and Napoleon’s coup were 
yet to come. Therefore, the alliance with France gave southerners and Jeffersonians the 
chance to advocate the containment of the Haitian Revolution under the pretext of this 
alliance.
The Washington administration succeeded in its goals of aiding the French and 
expanding trade. However, in its third goal, the prevention of British involvement in 
Saint Domingue, it was a failure. Arguably, this fact was no fault of the administration 
itself. France did not help matters any when on February 1, 1793 it declared war on 
Britain, entangling further the world's greatest power in the French Revolution.45 Wary 
that the rebellion in Saint Domingue might spread to the English colonies and anxious to 
displace France from its own colony, the British invaded Saint Domingue on September 
20 of the same year. Prime Minister William Pitt and Secretary of War Henry Dundas 
believed in the revolutionary confusion of 1793 that they could take over the French West 
Indian colonies.46 For the next five years, Britain would fight the French, the Spanish, 
and the black revolutionaries to attempt to gain control over Saint Domingue. In 1793, 
the Spanish also entered the war in Saint Domingue, and a young black later known as 
Toussaint Louverture joined the Spanish army to help drive out the French. By the end 
of Washington's second term in 1796, Toussaint had switched sides to the French, driven 
the Spanish out of Saint Domingue, and proceeded to win several victories against the 
British. This brilliant and dynamic leader would become the focal point of American 
diplomacy with Saint Domingue for the next two Presidential administrations.
Chapter II: The Adams1 Administration
The Challenge of gi/asi-Diplomacy
John Adams inherited a complex diplomatic situation in regards to Saint 
Domingue when he took over the Presidency in 1797. America's foreign relations were 
going through a dramatic reorientation that began in Washington's second term. A crisis 
with Britain had been avoided by the signing of Jay's Treaty in 1794, and normally 
volatile relations with Britain were at their most stable point since the end of the 
Revolution. Conversely, Jay's Treaty alienated and offended France, which became 
increasingly hostile towards American shipping on the high seas, including the trade with 
Saint Domingue. Although these changes in the traditional diplomatic paradigm already 
presented Adams with a unique and difficult challenge, developments in Saint Domingue 
further complicated Adams' task. With Toussaint's ascendancy, Saint Domingue had a 
black leader that equated total emancipation with independence, although his feelings 
about independence were not always clear to the British, French, or Americans. For the 
next eight years, the United States could no longer simply develop a foreign policy 
concerning Saint Domingue; it would have to develop diplomacy with the emerging 
nation of Haiti. Worsening relations with France made the prospects of aiding France's 
reconquest of Saint Domingue less palatable to American policy makers. Changing 
circumstances and policy goals would force the United States to deal with Toussaint 
explicitly.
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The Adams administration would have to reconcile America's own changing 
alliances within the context of the Quasi-War with France. From 1796 to 1800, the 
United States would fight a quasi war against its former ally France, enter into a quasi 
alliance with its former enemy Britain, and deal with the quasi government of Toussaint, 
to which the United States would eventually grant quasi recognition, later repudiated 
after Haitian independence.47 Although Adams' time in office was the shortest of the first 
three Presidents, the shifts in American policy concerning the Haitian Revolution during 
his term were the greatest.
To fully understand American policy, one must understand the political and 
military situation in Saint Domingue in 1797. After the British invasion in September 
1793, Toussaint was still fighting for the Spanish. His force of four thousand troops was 
the most well-armed and well-trained of the black troops. After the February 1794 
decree by the French National Convention abolishing slavery in Saint Domingue, 
Toussaint, with his still growing army, changed sides to Republican France and killed the 
white Spaniards under his command. By the end of 1795, Toussaint had driven the 
Spanish back into Santo Domingo, defeated the English in several battles, and eliminated 
most of his black and mulatto rivals. By the time Adams entered the Presidency in early 
1797, Toussaint had become the commander in chief of all French armies in Saint
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Domingue and was the most powerful man on the island. From the American 
perspective, these were remarkable accomplishments. An astute diplomat as well as 
military strategist, Toussaint increasingly sought to convert his military successes into 
diplomatic capital. He would prove adept at manipulating the changing circumstances to 
his advantage.
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The circumstance that aided Toussaint the most was the deteriorating relationship 
between France and the United States. The government of Republican France, having 
initiated war with England in 1793, found Jay's Treaty an affront to its friendship with the 
United States. France was incensed that the United States continued to maintain heavy 
trade with Great Britain and Saint Domingue. On July 2, 1796, the Directory ordered that 
American ships be treated like the British, thereby suppressing American neutral rights 
and de facto nullifying the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce.49 The United States 
was on its way to the Quasi-War with France. Adams’ inherited this naval conflict when 
he took office, which started late enough in Washington's presidency that he did not have 
time to establish a coherent policy. The Quasi-War significantly compromised the 
Washington administration's strategy of maintaining French sovereignty on Saint 
Domingue in order to secure American commerce and isolate the slave rebellion. 
Explicit aid to France was now out of the question. Moreover, France, much to the 
dismay of Toussaint and American merchants, had forbidden American trade with Saint 
Domingue. American merchants now had to directly thwart France in order to continue 
commerce with Saint Domingue.
Adams had to develop a new policy to reflect the circumstances. Nevertheless, 
many of the same goals were carried over from the Washington administration. Adams, a 
Federalist, was still extremely interested in maintaining commerce with Saint Domingue. 
Jefferson, relegated to the Vice-Presidency, was not in a position of power to combat 
Adams. Toussaint, knowing the importance of American supplies, was worried that his 
army would lose strength without American aid.50 Hence, Adams knew that once 
American ships reached Saint Domingue, they would be free under Toussaint's
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supervision to conduct commerce. Toussaint became increasingly unwilling to enforce 
the French decree. Only the French navy in the Caribbean, which was no small 
impediment, could stop American ships from trading with Saint Domingue. The goal of 
trade, besides profit, was now to injure France.
The other policy carryover from the Washington administration was the goal of 
keeping Britain off the island. Adams and his administration had the delicate task of 
trying to reduce French influence over Saint Domingue while not letting the British fill 
the vacuum. In 1797, Toussaint handed the British several more defeats and had pushed 
them to the far western edge of the island.51 British military domination of the island was 
looking increasing unlikely. Nevertheless, Adams was determined to keep the United 
States and not Britain in the good graces of Toussaint, lest the British, who were far less 
vulnerable to French naval attacks, dominate trade with Saint Domingue.
France also had to develop new policies to combat American trade. Knowing that 
Toussaint would not enforce the ban on American shipping and that the French navy 
would not be able to stop all American ships headed to Saint Domingue, French 
policymakers began to discuss a creative solution. Essentially, France knew it was 
fighting against the law of supply and demand. Toussaint and Saint Domingue required 
certain supplies, which the Americans could readily and cheaply provide because of their 
resources and geographical position. If France could supply Saint Domingue as easily as 
the Americans did, it would be able to compete with American shipping, prevent Britain 
from ever controlling the island's trade, and in all probability, reestablish a firm control 
over Saint Domingue. The problem was that France needed somewhere in the New 
World to supply Saint Domingue. As early as 1794, with the conclusion of Jay's Treaty,
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France began to discuss the possibility of Spain’s retrocession of the Louisiana Territory. 
In theory, Louisiana could be the needed granary and woodshop for Saint Domingue. 
Citizen Edmund Genet, Republican France's first minister to the United States, said in 
1795, "Louisiana extends her arms to us; we find there all we have to hope for from 
America, and we fortify ourselves double in that way against all we may fear from her."52 
Louisiana and Saint Domingue would become increasingly linked in the minds of French 
and American policymakers, so much so that by Jefferson's Presidency the two issues 
could not be separated. However, Spain was not anxious to cede such a significant 
section of territory, and Genet's suggestion remained a suggestion only. For the 
remainder of Adams' term, France would have to find other methods to control trade and 
rebuff the Americans.
Meanwhile, British troops had suffered devastating losses at the hands of 
Toussaint, and yellow fever had decreased their ranks even further. By early 1798, 
Toussaint, commanding all French forces in Saint Domingue, had cornered the British 
forces under General Maitland on the far western edge of the island. Anxious to extricate 
themselves from a losing position and to salvage some gains from their costly expedition, 
the British Government ordered General Maitland to negotiate a treaty with Toussaint. 
Despite knowing that he had the British defeated and on the run, Toussaint also was eager 
to end the fighting with the British. A rival general from a mulatto faction, Antoine 
Rigaud, was challenging Toussaint for supremacy on the island, and war between the two 
looked increasingly likely. Toussaint needed to free his army to prepare to fight 
Rigaud.53 Toussaint and Maitland entered into negotiations in May of 1798, and on 
August 31, they signed a secret treaty. In exchange for British withdrawal and a promise
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never to invade Saint Domingue again, Toussaint agreed to secure British trade with the 
island and promised not to invade Jamaica. Interestingly, Toussaint also stipulated that 
the British must allow American trade to reach Saint Domingue should it be resumed.54 
Although this demand must have been hard to accept for the British, Maitland’s 
precarious military position allowed him little leeway in the negotiations.
This secret treaty became controversial almost immediately. It is unknown how 
France and the United States first became aware of the agreement, but neither the British 
nor Toussaint made any special efforts to hide the compact. Initially, spectators in France 
and Britain questioned its legality. Toussaint signed the agreement in the name of the 
French Republic, but he technically had no legal authority to negotiate. Rufus King, the 
United States' minister to Great Britain, was concerned to the degree it was legally 
binding. Perhaps earlier than anyone outside Saint Domingue, King realized that despite 
Toussaint's claims to the contrary, he was acting as if Saint Domingue was an 
independent nation, which, King concluded, therefore, must be his ultimate goal. King 
wrote to the British Secretary of State in December 1798 justifying the legality of 
American trade with the island, "If St. Domingo is an Independent State, we as well as 
you may trade with there." King realized that the independence of Saint Domingue 
would be beneficial for American trade. Nevertheless, he believed that Maitland's treaty 
could have "mischievous effects" on American slavery. Toussaint was indeed preparing 
for eventual independence. Why else would an apparent agent of France enter into an 
agreement that was in spirit anti-French? By entering into this agreement with Maitland 
and securing trade with Great Britain and the United States, Toussaint ensured British 
and American supplies should there be a break with France. However, at the time, the
33
needs of the Quasi-War, the Franco-British War, and the racist belief in the impossibility 
of a free and independent black state clouded this fact.
Refugees, Congress, and the "Toussaint Clause"
The departure of British armies from Saint Domingue created another problem for 
American policymakers. Thousands of planters that had relied upon the British for 
protection from the revolting blacks fled to the United States. The British had not 
allowed these planters and their slaves passage to their islands, lest its own colonies 
become “infected” with the stories told by the slaves from Saint Domingue. However, 
the British were more than happy to escort these refugees to the United States. This 
second wave of emigres numbered about ten thousand with most arriving in Delaware 
and Virginia. Many of these refugees were free mulattoes and free blacks, which deeply 
concerned many southerners. Jefferson wrote in August of 1797,
Perhaps the first chapter o f this history, which has begun in St. Domingo, and the next succeeding 
ones, which will recount how all the whites were driven from the islands . . . where shall the 
colored emigrants go? And the sooner we put some plan underway, the greater hope there is that 
it may be permitted to proceed peaceably to its ultimate effect. But if something is not done, and 
soon done, we shall be the murderers of our own children . .  . and only a single spark is wanting to 
make that day to-morrow.55
Certainly Jefferson represented the extreme end of such racist fears, but as the leader and
ideological figurehead of the emerging Republican party, his influence should not be
underestimated. Jefferson's statement, especially considering its strong language,
represents a real fear, a belief that events in Saint Domingue endangered slavery; a belief,
in the great paradox of pre-Civil War America, that black slavery guaranteed white
liberty.
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Henry Tazwell, a United States Senator from Virginia, wrote to James Madison 
and estimated that about four thousand planned to settle in Virginia alone. He also 
informed Madison that the Governor of South Carolina issued a proclamation forbidding 
any refugees from Saint Domingue, black or white, from entering the state. No doubt, 
such actions were based on a fear of a spreading slave revolt rather than with a concern 
for monetary assistance to the planters. Many states, as with the previous wave of 
emigres from Saint Domingue, were calling for Presidential help in dealing with this 
unstable situation. A bill was submitted in the Senate that would give the President the 
power "to prohibit the landing of any Negroes, mulattoes, or white persons . . . (that) 
might be dangerous to our repose." Tazwell and Madison, being strict constitutionalist 
Republicans, believed that such fears were exaggerated and that the plight of the refugees 
"was soon seen to be a fit occasion here for the acquirement of a new power to the 
Executive at the expense of the Constitution."56 Tazwell and Madison feared that Adams 
might exploit the situation in Saint Domingue to expand the powers of the executive 
office, which is exactly what he would do a year later. Tazwell and Madison, like 
Jefferson a few years earlier, were fearful of expanding federal power and believed the 
problem of the immigrant situation was a matter for the individual states to decide. Most 
Federalists even were not willing to grant the president such sweeping powers, and the 
measure died on the Senate floor.
Although the measure failed, the issue proved to be a catalyst for a lengthy 
Congressional debate of American policy towards Toussaint, France, and Saint 
Domingue. In late 1798, with the Quasi-War at its height and Toussaint fighting his rival 
Rigaud for control of Saint Domingue, the Senate discussed the relationship between the
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United States and Saint Domingue. The outcome of this debate would determine the 
United States' future relationship with Toussaint Louverture.
The Senate, taking an unusually active role in foreign policy, debated whether or 
not to cease trade with all France's colonies, which would be standard practice 
considering a state of war existed between France and the United States. However, such 
a measure would prevent trade with Saint Domingue, thereby cutting off Toussaint's main 
source of supply. Therefore, the Senate debated what would be known as the "Toussaint 
Clause," which would allow the President to resume by executive order trade with any 
individual French colony. Tazwell accused the Federalists of conspiring with England 
"of involving this Country in a War with France" by allowing the emigres to enter the 
United States. He charged that England wanted to "influence" the Southern states and 
push the United States into war with France.57
Although Tazwell saw the Federalists as plotting with England against the South, 
the debate fell into ambiguous sectional and party divisions. Federalist Senator James 
Otis from Massachusetts supported the "Toussaint Clause" and went so far as to state that 
Toussaint should declare independence and the United States should grant recognition to 
his government. He argued this stance for two reasons. First, the United States should 
obey the standing principle of recognizing de facto whoever controlled the government. 
Second, such action would maintain commercial relations and assure that Saint 
Domingue would not be forced to resort to piracy and "buccaneering."58 Many Senators, 
especially Federalists with merchant connections, were concerned that if Toussaint was 
isolated and trade was forbidden with Saint Domingue, Toussaint would turn his island 
into a haven for pirates, which would disrupt commerce all over the Caribbean. Otis
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argued that the Haitians "if driven to despair . . . could inflict deeps wounds on our 
commerce."59 Robert Goodloe Harper from South Carolina argued with his fellow 
Federalist, saying that the "Toussaint Clause" says to other colonies, "rise and shake off 
your allegiance." Yet he argued that such a policy, if handled correctly, would give the 
United States the opportunity to expand its influence and trade in the absence of the 
European powers.
Albert Gallatin, the staunch Republican from Pennsylvania, agreed with Harper 
that such a measure was essentially telling Toussaint to continue on a course for total 
independence. However, for Gallatin that independence would be a dire threat to the 
security of the United States. He argued that the population of Saint Domingue has:
been initiated to liberty only by that series of rapine, pillage, and massacre, that have laid waste 
and deluged that island in blood; of men, who, if left to themselves, if altogether independent, are 
by no means likely to apply themselves to peaceful cultivation of the country, but will try to 
continue to live, as heretofore, by plunder and depredation. . . .  I am against any measure which 
may imbody (sic) so dangerous a description of men in our neighborhood.60
Gallatin's racist paternalism would set the tone for foreign relations with Haiti for over a
century. He was saying explicitly that a free and independent Saint Domingue was not
prepared for independence and would be a threat to American liberty and freedom. For
Gallatin, the issue transcended the mere pecuniary interests of commerce. Gallatin
continued to argue that the interests of this black nation would be "black only," and an
independent black state would always be "eternally hostile" to the slaveholding United
States. Therefore, the policy of the United States must aim to discourage Haitian
independence and aid France in maintaining sovereignty over the island, which meant
ending the Quasi-War and resuming normal relations with France.
Such a policy of rapprochement was more agreeable to the pro-French
Republicans than to the sometimes Francophobic Federalists. Thomas Pinckney, another
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South Carolina Federalist, retorted that although he did agree that a free Saint Domingue 
was a threat to the South and lamented that "nothing which we can do . . . can bring back 
the internal state of that island to the state it was formerly in," he believed that Saint 
Domingue was a greater threat to the South if it remained in the hands of France. His 
argument was threefold; France could use Saint Domingue as a staging point for an 
invasion of the United States, which would certainly threaten the South; if Saint 
Domingue was independent, the United States could act unilaterally should the island 
become hostile; and finally, Pinckney believed that Toussaint would turn to the British 
for aid should the United States neglect him.61 Pinckney's argument would prove 
prophetic, as Thomas Jefferson would eventually come to agree with this logic during his 
presidency.
The debate over the "Toussaint Clause" revealed several fascinating ideological 
divisions. Republicans, most of whom were from the South, agreed with Gallatin and 
were adamantly against any action that might lead to Haitian independence believing that 
it would be detrimental to slavery and Southern liberty. Northern Federalists, like Otis, 
were mostly in favor of keeping open trade with Saint Domingue. They were more 
worried than were their Southern colleagues about the loss of trade and the possibility of 
Saint Domingue becoming a Caribbean pirate stronghold. Southern Federalists, like 
Harper and Pinckney, held a moderate position that ultimately decided the fate of the 
"Toussaint Clause." Although they acknowledged that an independent black state under 
Toussaint would be an intrinsic symbolic and real threat to slavery and the South, it was 
more important that the United States seize the opportunity to destroy France's influence 
in the region and to expand the American sphere of power and commerce. The United
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States, being the strongest power in the region, would naturally fill the vacuum left by 
France's absence. Now that England had left the island, this opportunity was even 
greater. Moreover, the Southern Federalists believed that if properly managed, the 
United States could control any adverse effects of Haitian independence.
The bill forbidding all commerce with France and its colonies, yet giving the 
President the authority to resume trade with an individual colony, passed the Senate 
largely along party lines. The Southern Federalists proved to be the deciding votes. 
Jefferson was concerned that the Federalists were trying to further the break with France 
by continuing trade with Saint Domingue. He wrote to James Monroe that the "Toussaint 
Clause" debates "will be a circumstance of high aggravation to [France]."62 He was 
incensed that the Federalists openly admitted that the purpose of the bill was "to facilitate 
the separation of the island from France." Jefferson wrote to Aaron Burr that the 
Southern states were fearful of the Haitians' "free ingress and intercourse with their black 
brethren." He warned that the South must be "guarded against the cannibals of the 
terrible republic."63 Jefferson believed that Toussaint's treaty with Maitland was "the best 
thing for us" because "the English will probably forbid them the ocean, confine them to 
their island, and thus preventing their becoming an American Algiers."64 Once again, 
Jefferson was articulating the deep-seated fears of a large portion of the population that 
opposed the Federalist policy towards Saint Domingue. Unknown to Jefferson, he would 
have to confront these fears more directly than he ever imagined when he assumed the 
Presidency in two years.
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Adam's Dilemma
President Adams now faced a difficult decision. Although the "Toussaint Clause" 
passed under largely Federalist support, the bill still closed trade with Saint Domingue 
and other French colonies, and it only gave Adams the option to reopen it. The decision, 
and therefore the bulk of the responsibility fell on Adams, not the Senate. The debate in 
the Senate prefaced the crux of Adam's dilemma. Should he pursue a policy that 
assumed eventual Haitian independence? If so, what policies should the United States 
enact that would diminish any threat to American interests, be they protection of slavery 
or the maintenance of commerce, and would maximize American power and influence? 
Adams believed, as his Secretary of the Treasury, stated in a letter to him, "On the 
renewal of commercial Intercourse the Island of St. Domingo would be declared 
independent."65 Adams agreed with Senators Pinckney and Harper that resuming trade 
with Toussaint would be both an opportunity and a responsibility. The Maitland Treaty 
removed British forces from Saint Domingue and further removed the threat of British 
control over the island. Adams believed that the removal of Great Britain from the island 
freed the United States to pursue a more activist policy. The United States could now 
concentrate on prosecuting the Quasi-War with France and be less concerned with the 
ramifications for the British in Saint Domingue. Adams realized that the United States 
and Britain essentially held the same goals concerning Saint Domingue: continuing trade 
and diminishing French power on the island. For both nations, this course meant one 
thing—supporting Toussaint Louverture.
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Adams decided upon a set of remarkable diplomatic tactics to further these goals; 
he would send secret aid to Toussaint, as a struggle between him and the pro-French 
Rigaud was becoming imminent; he would instruct King in London to open a dialogue 
with the British to explore joint action in support of Toussaint; and after a small delay, 
Adams would reopen regular trade with Saint Domingue under the powers granted by the 
Toussaint Clause. Historian Rayford Logan described these tactics as a "quasi- 
diplomatic revolution" in the United States.66 Adams was proposing to give direct 
military aid to a black leader of a slave revolt-tumed-revolution and to enter into a 
concert with the United States' traditional archrival. While this "revolution" may have 
been short lived, it nevertheless was a drastic and controversial shift in traditional 
American diplomacy. Adams hoped to play a double-sided card. He wanted to support 
Toussaint's bid to control Saint Domingue, even recognizing that such a move might 
eventually lead to independence, while at the same time try to control the dangerous 
ramifications of allowing the creation of a black state composed of former slaves.
Adams believed that the United States needed Great Britain's help to achieve 
these goals. King in London proceeded to discuss with the British Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Grenville, the possibilities of Haitian independence and joint Anglo-American 
action. King had the task of convincing Great Britain that it was in their interests to act 
in concert with the United States, no small feat in 1798 and 1799. He wrote to Grenville, 
"Would not the independence of Saint Domingue inevitably have a great influence upon 
Jamaica and the other islands . . . and would not the independence of Saint Domingue 
predicate the abolition of the white Colony System in that quarter of the world?" To 
King, the downfall of the "Colony System" was inevitable as was Haitian independence.
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King was arguing to Grenville that Great Britain needed to take action with the United 
States "to employ such measures as seem best adapted to diminish the Evils of the event
fTQ
when it arrives."
King proposed to Grenville that Great Britain and the United States develop "a 
comprehensive as well as cautious Policy to protect those interests and to turn to profit if 
possible the changes o f which the Independence o f Saint Domingo is the forerunner . . . 
(and) to apprehend some inconveniences from the influence of the example upon our 
slaves in the Southern States."69 Grenville indicated to King that he thought that Saint 
Domingue would indeed soon become independent and that the United States and Great 
Britain should act in concert to control trade and limit the "domino effect" of slave 
insurrections. Believing that Haitian independence was probable if not inevitable, the 
United States and Great Britain could use Toussaint to injure France and enhance their 
trade. King and Adams were moving further in the direction of a traditional European 
realist policy of national interest. By accepting the eventual independence of Saint 
Domingue, Adams opened new policy options, namely working with Great Britain to 
secure American commercial and security interests. Adams and King were playing 
European power politics, not the “new diplomacy” that Adams outlined in his Model 
Treaty.
In Saint Domingue, Toussaint was increasingly making evident his desire for 
autonomy. "The War of Knives" had broken out between Toussaint and the more pro- 
French mulatto Rigaud in early 1799. Toussaint had rebuffed every attempt by the 
French government to control his authority. Because Napoleon was just beginning to 
consolidate his power and was occupied in Egypt, Saint Domingue did not yet receive the
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full attention of the French government. However, Toussaint was anxious to secure 
outside help for any upcoming conflict with France. On May 22, 1799, Toussaint entered 
into a tripartite treaty with the United States and England. Very similar to Maitland's 
treaty, this treaty of 1799 stipulated that all ports in Saint Domingue under Toussaint's 
control would be open to British ships carrying either British or American goods, that 
Toussaint would not attack Jamaica or the Southern United States, and guaranteed that 
the British would not interrupt commerce or harass Toussaint's small navy.70 However, 
the treaty did not apply to the southern part of the island that Rigaud controlled. 
Toussaint viewed this treaty as somewhat of a coup since he was not planning to invade 
anywhere. Although he was unhappy about having to use British merchants and ships to 
get American supplies, his skillful manipulation of American and British fears won him 
much needed commercial and military support on the eve of civil war with Rigaud.
Jefferson and the Republicans were strongly opposed to the treaty for the same 
reasons they were opposed to the Toussaint Clause. However, the only change to the 
treaty that they were able to enact was adding an amendment "opposing the 
indoctrination of the slaves of both [England and the United States] with 'dangerous 
principles.'"71 Adams was breaking all the traditional diplomatic rules, while at the same 
time, abandoning the high moral diplomatic principles of American "new diplomacy." 
This tripartite treaty was for all practical purposes recognition of Toussaint's government 
and of the eventual independence of Saint Domingue. This entire policy was coming 
from the man who wrote the Model Treaty!72 Adams' Haitian policy was beginning to 
show all the characteristics of traditional European style power politics. Adams could not 
overlook this opportunity to expand the American commercial and political empire at the
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expense of a European power. Adams and his fellow Federalists placed more emphasis 
on the balance of power than did their Republican counterparts. Permitting France to 
maintain control over Saint Domingue would increasingly tilt that balance towards 
France. This would be an unacceptable course of action while the United States could 
relatively inexpensively prevent it. Although American support would not guarantee 
Toussaint's survival much less independence, Adams wanted to be in Toussaint's good 
graces, lest he turn to the British for help or reconcile with France.
Alexander Hamilton, though not in a position of power during Adams' 
Presidency, strongly supported Adams' policy. In fact, he was outspoken in his support 
for the independence of Saint Domingue. Bom in the West Indies and being the 
quintessential Federalist and Francophobe, Hamilton salivated over the opportunities that 
Haitian independence would provide. He believed that the United States should be 
tactful in its support of Toussaint.
The United States must not be committed to the Independent of St. Domingo. No guaranty— no 
formal treaty— nothing that can rise up in judgment. It will be enough to let Toussaint be assured 
verbally, but explicitly, that upon his declaration of independence a commercial intercourse will 
be opened, and continue while he maintains it, and gives due protection to our vessels and 
property. I incline to think his declaration of independence ought to proceed.73
Hamilton did not want to sign any formal treaty or agreement with Toussaint that 
guaranteed American support for Haitian independence. Rather he thought a more 
passive approach was necessary. Hamilton knew that Toussaint needed the United States 
more than the United States needed him, and Hamilton realized that this advantage 
allowed the United States to be formally noncommittal to Toussaint. Nevertheless, he 
strongly favored Haitian independence. In a letter to Timothy Pickering, Hamilton even 
outlined the form of government that he believed Toussaint ought to adopt. Hamilton 
called for an extremely strong executive. He argued that the President should have the
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power to declare war and control trade, while tax and criminal regulation should be left to 
an assembly of generals and military officers. A legislative branch, elected by the 
educated and wealthy, should exist only to handle trivial maters.74 No doubt Hamilton’s 
faith in the population of Saint Domingue to establish a proper republic was little greater 
than his more racist southern colleagues. Hamilton believed that by giving the executive 
the powers of war and trade, the United States would be able to easily manipulate Saint 
Domingue because of its significant commercial and military advantages. It would only 
have to control one person in the form of the executive. A powerful legislative branch 
would complicate matters significantly for future American policymakers.75
Escalation and Peace
In early 1800, the British discovered agents from Saint Domingue in Jamaica that . 
were allegedly stirring up rebellion and preparing the way for an invasion from Saint 
Domingue. The British were infuriated that Toussaint would violate the tripartite treaty. 
However, they were not prepared to totally cut off support for him. Therefore, in 
retaliation the British destroyed Toussaint's small fleet of gunboats and frigates, thereby 
eliminating any threat of invasion. Toussaint insisted that the agents were sent there by a 
subordinate and that he was unaware of them. This explanation seems to be consistent 
with the evidence. At no time did Toussaint ever indicate that his goals extended beyond 
the island. Toussaint was hoping to use his fleet to attempt a land and sea attack on 
Jacmel, Rigaud's last stronghold in the south. However, the British action opened the 
door for an escalation of American involvement. Adams sent the American navy to fill
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the void left by the destruction of Toussaint's ships. The American frigates Boston, 
Connecticut, Constitution, and the General Greene, supported Toussaint in the operation
76by bombarding Rigaud's forces and destroying his privateering barges. Toussaint cited 
this naval support as key to his victory. Adams set precedents with the first incident of 
direct military intervention in a foreign revolution and the first military intervention in 
Latin America in American history. Although Adams' could argue that his support of 
Toussaint was simply an extension of the prosecution of the Quasi-War against France, 
Rigaud was more a rival faction to Toussaint than an extension of French authority.
Meanwhile, Congress began to become concerned again with the implications of 
Toussaint’s imminent victory. Congress was still hesitant to accept de facto Haitian 
independence and the creation of a black state, but support for Toussaint remained strong. 
In February 1800, Congress passed a seemingly contradictory bill. The act stipulated that 
Saint Domingue would be considered a French protectorate, but it also established
77provisions for the recognition of Toussaint's government. By passing this bill, 
Congress was preventing any future debate on formal recognition of Haiti should 
Toussaint or one of his successors declare independence. However, Congress wanted to 
ensure that the United States would still have a friendly relationship with their southern 
neighbor. America could not afford a hostile Saint Domingue.
Adams also hoped to walk this fine line. In early 1800, events led him to 
undertake two seemingly incongruous initiatives. First, Adams had already escalated 
American involvement in the Haitian Revolution by sending naval support to Toussaint, 
but he went even farther by using the powers given him in the Toussaint Clause. In 
September, Adams signed a decree opening all ports in Saint Domingue to American
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shipping.78 Toussaint was no doubt pleased that he could openly receive supplies from 
the United States again without having to use the British intermediaries. The British 
viewed this decree as a violation of the 1799 tripartite treaty and began seizing the 
American ships heading to Saint Domingue. The short-lived quasi-alliance with England 
was broken, and relations with Britain would continue to deteriorate until the War of 
1812.
Second, American agents in France signed the Treaty of Mortfontaine in 
September of 1800, ending the Quasi-War with France. Despite Adams’ overt support 
for Toussaint, the nation and Adams were tiring of the Quasi-War. Interestingly, the 
treaty made no mention of Saint Domingue. The omission was probably in the best 
interests of the United States considering Adams and Congress wanted to maintain 
ostensible French control over the island while maintaining the commercial status quo. 
As long as Toussaint controlled Saint Domingue under the guise of French authority, the 
United States would be safe from French aggression and from Toussaint spreading the 
evils of slave insurrection. France and Toussaint would be a double check upon each 
other. As long as both shared authority in Saint Domingue, the best interests of the 
United States would be served.
Adams realized that his policies might lead to eventual Haitian independence, but 
by late 1800, that possibility did not seem as likely as it did in early 1799. By September 
of 1800, when Adams reopened trade, Toussaint had driven out Rigaud and was the 
master of the island. Yet, he gave no public indication of wanting to declare 
independence. Adams, with the support of Congress, wanted to ensure Toussaint's 
control of Saint Domingue while ensuring at least nominal French sovereignty over the
47
island. As with the Washington administration, the United States wanted to continue to 
reap the commercial benefits of trade with Saint Domingue while leaving France with the 
responsibility of containing the rebelling blacks to their island. Adams was willing to go 
farther than his predecessor because a strong French presence in Saint Domingue became 
a greater threat to American national security than it was during Washington’s terms in 
office. Through some extraordinary measures—the alliance with England, the direct 
military and commercial support of Toussaint, and the recognition of Toussaint’s 
authority—Adams was able to achieve these goals. What Adams accomplished with his 
foreign policy concerning Saint Domingue was a key factor in the success of the Treaty 
of Mortfontaine, and it laid the groundwork for Jefferson's success with Louisiana. 
Furthermore, trade with Saint Domingue was booming. By 1800, American trade, not 
including re-exports, had increased to 4.8 million dollars, which amounted to fifteen 
percent of all American exports.79 Ironically, in the process of securing American 
commercial and security interests, the author of the Model Treaty utterly dismissed its 
principles during his term in office. Adams proved to be a practitioner of European 
realpolitik to the highest degree, and to his credit, adjusted the “status quo” policy of 
Washington to successfully account for the changes in the international political climate.
However, the political climate in the United States and the world at large was 
changing further in 1800. Federalists suffered astounding defeats in the elections of 
1800, and Thomas Jefferson—Francophile, slaveowner, and staunch critic of Adams 
policies—ascended to the presidency. The era of Federalist diplomacy was at an end, and 
the continuation of support for Toussaint Louverture rested in the hands of a slave owner. 
Just as significant for Saint Domingue, Napoleon Bonaparte's attention began to shift to
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his small island. Napoleon was at the same time fascinated and frustrated by the success 
of Toussaint. Over the next four years, Napoleon would try to regain absolute control 
over Saint Domingue and attempt to restore the now destroyed plantation system. This 
reconquest Toussaint could not accept. Once again, American policymakers would turn 
their attention to Saint Domingue, and the consequences of the events during Jefferson 
administration would give rise to one nation and double the size of another.
Chapter III: The Jefferson Administration
Continuation or Departure?
When Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated in 1801, the United States had been 
dealing with the revolution in Saint Domingue for nearly a decade. Jefferson was 
inheriting ten years of foreign policy concerning and with Saint Domingue. He had to 
decide whether or not to continue in the spirit of his predecessors, of whose policies 
toward Saint Domingue he was often critical. Despite Adam’s successes, the specter of 
slavery and Jefferson's domino theory never disappeared from the table. Jefferson would 
have to either accede to or combat the fears of southern planters and politicians, who had 
quickly gained power and influence in the federal government with the rise of 
Jeffersonian Republicanism. Like Washington and Adams, Jefferson would have to 
make difficult decisions concerning American foreign policy towards Saint Domingue 
and Toussaint Louverture. Although he publicly denied it, Toussaint believed it was the 
destiny of Saint Domingue to become a free and independent nation. Jefferson believed 
it was the destiny of the United States to spread across the continent. Unforeseen by 
either, each would use savvy diplomacy and an unlikely coincidence of interests to secure 
both nations' futures.
Jefferson entered the presidency optimistic towards the future of Saint Domingue, 
meaning that he was confident that France would maintain sovereignty and the rebellion 
would be contained to the island. With the rise of Jefferson and the Republicans, the 
Federal government became momentarily less concerned with commerce, and Jefferson’s
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administration initially had a more pro-French stance that did its predecessor. Madison 
perhaps best summed up the administration's initial attitude towards France and Saint 
Domingue when he wrote to Tobias Lear, the American consul in Cap-Haitien, "The
United States would withdraw from Saint Domingue rather than hurt relations with
8 0France." The Treaty of Mortfontaine had given Jefferson hope that the United States'
problems with France were behind it. Jefferson wrote on March 21, 1801, "It ought to be
the very first object of our pursuits to have nothing to do with European interests and 
81politics." Jefferson did not want his policies encumbered by European wars and 
intrigues. His mission was to clean up the mess of Federalism at home and be an 
example to the world abroad. The messy revolution in Saint Domingue could only 
detract from both of these goals.
Jefferson's isolationist tendencies and his negrophobia seemingly did not bode 
well for Toussaint and Saint Domingue. The Treaty of Mortfontaine greatly distressed 
Toussaint, who used the conflict of the Quasi-War to ensure American aid. However, 
Toussaint was not an American puppet nor did he act like one. To show his displeasure 
and to illustrate to the Americans how crucial trade with Saint Domingue was, Toussaint 
raised tariffs on American goods and restricted certain ports from American trade. This
action also had the effect of placating France at a time when Toussaint was most
82  • vulnerable. Nevertheless, France was still unable to devote any significant attention to
Saint Domingue because of the war with England.
Toussaint had his own goals and ambitions to pursue no matter who occupied the
White House (or who was in control of France). Still acting under ostensible French
authority, Toussaint defeated his mulatto rival Rigaud in 1800, and in January 1801, he
51
invaded the Spanish half of the island, Santo Domingo, in the name of France. By 
instituting a system of forced labor, Toussaint had revived the island's economy and 
brought back relative prosperity. By the summer of 1801, Toussaint had reached the 
height of his power.
Visions of Empire
Two months after writing that the United States’ primary interest was to stay out 
of the affairs of Europe, Thomas Jefferson received a bit of news that would not only 
change that policy but the course of American, French, and Haitian history as well. On 
May 26, 1801, Jefferson wrote a letter to James Monroe revealing the news and a new 
policy: "There is considerable reason to apprehend that Spain cedes Louisiana and the 
Floridas to France. It is a policy very unwise in both, and very ominous to us."84 
Jefferson further elucidated his fears in a letter to William C. Claiborne, Governor of the 
Mississippi Territory:
With respect to Spain our disposition are sincerely amiable and even affectionate. We consider 
her possession of the adjacent country as most favorable to our interests, and should see, with 
extreme pain any other nation substituted for them . . . Should France get possession of that 
country, it will be more to be lamented than remedied by us, as it will furnish ground for profound 
consideration on our part, how best to conduct ourselves in that case.85
The implications of this news and Jefferson's feelings about the retrocession have been 
well covered in the historiography of the Louisiana Purchase. However, in relation to 
Toussaint and Saint Domingue, the historian cannot underestimate the profundity of the 
possibility of the retrocession of the Floridas and Louisiana to France. In short, it 
changed everything.
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Napoleon's visions of empire were beginning to encompass the New World as 
well as the Old. He wanted to use Louisiana as a breadbasket and wood shop for Saint 
Domingue. In Louisiana, France could develop the resources to maintain a large military 
presence and supply its Caribbean colonies. This possibility raised numerous problems 
for the Jefferson administration. The United States had an informal policy of cultivating 
friendly relationships with weaker neighbors in order to eliminate the balance of power
o / r
struggles that had plagued Europe. French control over Saint Domingue was tolerable 
and welcome because it posed no strategic threat to the United States. If France ever 
decided to use the island as a staging point for an invasion, the United States could 
simply cut supplies to the island or establish a naval blockade. Moreover, the British 
would not likely tolerate a strong French military presence in Saint Domingue because it 
would be perceived as a threat to its colonies as well. French control of Louisiana and 
Florida was a different matter. Napoleon was an aggrandizing leader whose ambitions 
knew no boundaries. Considering the expanse of the territory, the United States could 
hardly cordon off Louisiana and Florida from American soil. Furthermore, Napoleon 
would not nearly be as pliable as the Spanish were in permitting American goods pass 
through New Orleans. In a time of crisis, the United States would have an aggressive and 
powerful nation along its entire western border.
Jefferson was not willing to tolerate such a situation, and this new possibility all 
but eliminated the Jefferson administration's overt Francophilia. Jefferson and Madison 
knew that the key to Louisiana was Saint Domingue. Saint Domingue was a stepping- 
stone to the occupation of Louisiana for France. Napoleon was unarguably a strategic 
and tactical genius, but he could not work logistical miracles. Successful control of Saint
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87Domingue would be necessary in order to occupy Louisiana. There was one other 
person besides Jefferson and Madison who had a significant interest in thwarting 
Napoleon's plans—Toussaint Louverture. Once again, the black general became a de 
facto American ally.
Jefferson decided to resume trade with Toussaint quietly. Obviously, Toussaint 
was happy with the resumption of American trade. In August of 1801, Tobias Lear, the 
American consul in Saint Domingue wrote to James Madison that Toussaint was willing 
to open the island to further American trade: "Recent arrival of large number of 
American ships is pleasing to Toussaint and profitable to the treasury. At first 
opportunity will urge opening of all island ports and reduction of current twenty percent 
export duty on island produce."88 Toussaint knew that he needed American provisions, 
and he was willing to make concessions to get them. The previous month, Toussaint had 
issued a new constitution for Saint Domingue that proclaimed him governor for life and 
gave him the right to name his successor. His recognition of French authority was purely 
nominal by the fall of 1801, and he was anticipating a conflict with Napoleon and 
France.89 Fortunately, the resumption of prosperity the previous year allowed by 
Toussaint's forced-labor system could be parlayed into the necessary specie needed to by 
American supplies. Jefferson's timing was fortuitous for Toussaint.
James Madison further elaborated the administration's evolving policy to Robert 
Livingston, the newly appointed United States Minister to France. He wrote, "The 
peculiar and equivocal attitude taken by the island of Saint Domingo makes it proper that 
you should fully understand the present relations of the United States to it."90 Madison 
wanted to press upon Livingston the importance of Saint Domingue, but he either did not
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want to reveal how far the administration was willing to go to protect it interests in Saint 
Domingue or he was unsure himself of how far Jefferson would go. Madison assured 
Livingston that the United States would have no direct and official contact with Toussaint 
"that could excite suspicion or give offence to the French Republic." The goal of the 
United States was to maintain a policy of "strict and honorable neutrality." Such a policy 
was a far cry from the openly French rhetoric that marked the early days of the 
administration, and it would allow the United States to continue to trade with Toussaint. 
However, the United States could not afford to provoke Napoleon either. Such a 
provocation might hasten French possession of Louisiana and give Jefferson and 
Madison less time to develop a solution.
Madison wanted Livingston "to relieve the French Government from any doubts 
or errors they may be under as to the proceedings or views of the United States towards 
St. Domingo." Yet Madison ended his communique telling Livingston to keep him 
constantly informed of French ambitions and attitudes towards Saint Domingue.91 
Jefferson and Madison, like Washington and Adams before them, wanted to maintain 
status quo in Saint Domingue. In the context of 1801 and 1802, the most important 
aspect of that status quo hinged on Spanish control of Louisiana and the lack of a sizeable 
French military force in the Western Hemisphere. From Jefferson's perspective, 
Toussaint's authority was tolerable because his power acted as a significant roadblock to 
French occupation of Louisiana, and it did not hurt that American trade with Saint 
Domingue was filling the coffers of both countries.
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The Chess Game
Jefferson and Madison were playing for time. Whether they did so calculatingly, 
believing it would weaken Napoleon's resolve to pacify Toussaint and occupy Louisiana, 
or because they lacked any other viable solution was debatable and well covered in the 
Louisiana Purchase historiography. However, in relation to Saint Domingue, Jefferson's 
meetings with the French charge d' affaires Louis Pinchon during 1801 and 1802 
revealed a President who could skillfully manipulate global circumstances to achieve 
national goals. To be sure, Jefferson’s purchase of the entire Louisiana territory was 
completely unforeseen by him in 1801 and 1802 as he only had his eyes on the Floridas 
and New Orleans, but this was only because he viewed the acquisition of the entire
Q9territory as unrealistic. Jefferson's chess game with Pinchon and by proxy Napoleon 
resulted in a magnificent victory for the United States. The most powerful piece on 
Jefferson's side was Saint Domingue, and Jefferson intended to play it patiently. This 
metaphor does not mean to imply that Toussaint and the other Haitian nationalists were 
merely pieces played by the United States. Rather, they were co-equal participants in this 
high-stakes game. The astute historian could also argue that Toussaint used Jefferson and 
American ambitions to secure Haitian independence as much as Jefferson used Toussaint 
and Haitian ambitions to secure American territorial aggrandizement. This study does 
not pursue that argument further because of the lack of sources to provide this Haitian 
voice, which would be necessary to deduce Toussaint's thought process.
The newly appointed Pinchon, like Jefferson, believed that after the Treaty of 
Mortfontaine relations between the United States and France would become more
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amicable. Once Jefferson was elected, Pinchon's hopes rose even higher.93 Pinchon 
knew of Jefferson's affinity for France and wished to cultivate that affinity into a 
willingness to help France achieve its goals in the Western Hemisphere. The first of 
these goals was the reestablishment of real French sovereignty in Saint Domingue and the 
ousting of Toussaint Louverture. When Toussaint had submitted his new constitution to 
Napoleon for approval in July of 1801, he all but dared Napoleon to a direct 
confrontation. Pinchon, Napoleon, Jefferson, and Madison all knew that Toussaint was 
heading for independence and that the world's most powerful man would not allow such 
impertinence in one of his own colonies. The question was when that confrontation 
would come and in what form. Pinchon believed that Jefferson might be a willing partner 
in such an attempt. After all, Jefferson traditionally had been friendly to France, and 
Pinchon knew of Jefferson's fears of slave rebellion.94
However, Jefferson's first goal was to delay that confrontation, which would most 
likely be an invasion force, for as long as possible. After a meeting with Madison in June 
of 1801, Pinchon became less confident of any American aid when Madison stated that 
"the United States accepts things in [Saint Domingue] that colony without attempting to 
judge them" and the "administration could not risk falling out with Toussaint."95 This 
seemingly enlightened statement of non-judgment was meant to illustrate to Pinchon that 
France could not expect any American concessions on Saint Domingue if it occupied 
Louisiana. Madison cautioned Pinchon of the inherent dangers if France continued to 
pursue the retrocession of Louisiana from Spain. Madison warned that "this measure (the 
retrocession) . . . might compromise good harmony and cause to be suspected the reality . 
. . that France since the Revolution had never ceased to think of that possession."96 As
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early as the summer of 1801, there was explicitly no distinction between the United 
States' Louisiana policy and its Saint Domingue policy. The same could be said for 
France.
Jefferson did not want to completely alienate France yet, nor did he want to seem 
completely unreceptive to the idea of an American and French concert. Besides, 
Jefferson had no love for Toussaint nor a great wish for Haitian independence. Jefferson 
and Madison also wanted to maintain the once again profitable trade relationship between 
the United States and Saint Domingue, and they stated this desire explicitly to Pinchon. 
Jefferson told Pinchon that he did not want Haitian independence but that he merely 
wanted to ensure the continuation of commerce. Pinchon assured Jefferson that France 
had no desire to disrupt American commerce with Saint Domingue, which would drive 
Toussaint to the British, but he wanted assurances of American aid should France attempt 
to retake the island. Jefferson responded by saying that such an attempt would cause 
difficulty with the British. He suggested that "in order that this concert be complete and 
effective you must make peace with England, then nothing will be easier that to furnish
Q7your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation." Jefferson 
stated further that is was logical that the United States show no special favors to 
Toussaint because he represented "a menace to two-thirds of the states."
Pinchon interpreted this statement as a promise of American aid. However, by 
suggesting that France end its war with Britain, Jefferson was tacitly buying more time. 
Whether or not Jefferson was using the slavery issue merely as a pretext to deceive 
Pinchon is unclear, but most likely Jefferson wanted to keep all options open, especially 
considering the possibility of France taking control of Louisiana. Jefferson knew that
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Saint Domingue was his "ace in the hole" and he wanted to play his trump card at the
Q O
proper moment. For his part, Pinchon was wise in his choice of points on which to 
negotiate, namely slavery and commerce. Until Louisiana entered the picture, these were 
the salient two issues in American Saint Domingue policy. With the specter of French 
control of Louisiana, the primary issue became national security. It was this threat to 
national security that was the catalyst for the eventual purchase of Louisiana and the main 
reason why Jefferson continued to allow the United States to supply Toussaint.
Confrontation Conies At Last
Meanwhile, Jefferson's wish that France make peace with England came true 
sooner than expected. On October 1, 1801, the Peace of Amiens ended the war, and now 
Napoleon was free to concentrate upon his dreams of empire in the Western 
Hemisphere." During the peace negotiations, Napoleon received a nominal pledge from 
England to support a campaign to retake Saint Domingue. The British had implied that 
they no longer wished to see Toussaint in power because he was threatening British 
Caribbean colonies. Napoleon now believed, because of Jefferson's statement to Pinchon 
and the British statements made during peace negotiations, that he had the active support 
of the Americans and at least the passive support of Britain. Napoleon was hoping that at 
minimum he could count on the British to not interfere. On December 14, General 
Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, sailed from Brest for Saint 
Domingue with a force of 17,000 veteran French troops.100 Napoleon indeed wanted to 
use Saint Domingue as the springboard for an extensive reconquest of France's New
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World empire, a prospect made all the more lucrative with Spain's retrocession of 
Louisiana.101
Jefferson's initial response to the invasion was to propose to Pinchon that France 
recognize Saint Domingue as independent under the joint "protection" of Great Britain, 
the United States, and France. Pinchon reported Jefferson to have said:
Why will France not declare it independent under her protection and that o f the United States and 
England? Perhaps that would be w isest. . . Why should not the three powers unite to confine the 
pest on the island? Provided that the Negroes are not permitted to possess a navy, we can allow 
without danger to exist and we can moreover continue with them very lucrative commercial 
relations.102
Such a solution would have been in accordance with traditional American foreign policy 
towards Saint Domingue—it would have maintained the status quo. The idea of a 
concert to maintain nominal French sovereignty over the island in order to maintain 
commercial relations and contain the blacks was exactly what both Washington and 
Adams wished to do. Although Jefferson did not mention Louisiana in this conversation, 
in the context of 1801 and 1802, his idea would also have the benefit of eliminating the 
possibility of France using Saint Domingue as a staging point for the reconquest of its 
North American empire.
Pinchon and Napoleon became less confident of American support after this 
exchange. Pinchon repeatedly tried to get explicit support from Jefferson by assuring 
him that the French invasion was in the best interests of the United States. Pinchon 
prophetically wrote to Napoleon that "any plan which is not supported by this country 
[the United States] and which does not, above all, have the assurance of a constant supply 
of money and supplies will fail."103
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Jefferson's growing interest in Louisiana and increasing pressure from northern 
merchants not to disrupt trade were steadily solidifying his opposition to the Leclerc 
expedition, which would soon land in Saint Domingue. Angered by the American 
insistence on maintaining commerce, France attempted to blockade all ports of Saint 
Domingue. Pinchon requested to Jefferson that he inform his merchants to abide by the 
provisions of the blockade. Jefferson responded that it was impossible to stop merchants 
from trading, and he could only leave the merchants to risk their own fate.104 Coming 
from the President who would later order a national export embargo, Jefferson indeed 
believed he had the power to stop American merchants to a large degree. In 1801 and 
1802, he simply did not want to.
Pinchon was increasingly frustrated by Jefferson’s intransigence. Jefferson did 
not become any more flexible even when Pinchon played the race card. Pinchon 
announced that Toussaint intended "to throw off all submission to France, to the white 
race and to civilized nations."105 Pinchon was obviously attempting to ignite the racial 
fears of the American President to gamer support for France. If the United States would 
not help France for reasons of goodwill and mutual interest, then maybe it would help 
France out of mutual fears. Reports from Saint Domingue were also potentially 
inflammatory to Jefferson's racial sensibilities. Tobias Lear wrote to Madison in January 
1802 of the extreme fear in Saint Domingue that the France sought to reestablish slavery. 
Lear believed that slavery could only be restored if France chose to invade the island (he 
did not know that the expedition was already on its way) and chose to "destroy blacks in 
a contest." France "would have to do so for I do not believe they would ever again 
submit to the yoke of slavery: but before they could be extirpated, they would kill all
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whites in their power, and lay waste all the property that could be developed."106 Despite 
such reports, which seemed to confirm Jefferson's earlier feelings about the sanguinary 
nature of slave rebellions, Jefferson did not show any further inclination to aid France. 
What perhaps cemented Jefferson's feelings was a report from Madison in February in 
which he stated his belief "that a part of the force allotted for St. Domingo is directly or 
eventually destined to take possession of Louisiana."107 No amount of racial posturing 
could distract Jefferson from his primary policy goal of keeping France out of Louisiana.
In a desperate sounding letter to Talleyrand, Pinchon expressed his fear that the 
American thirst for commerce was greater than its fear of a free and independent black
10Rstate. Pinchon got it half right. Jefferson was still acting from a position of national 
security as much as he was from a desire for commerce. Realist diplomatic historians 
like Norman A. Graebner have argued that successful diplomacy results from clearly 
defined national interests.109 Jefferson's primary national interest was indeed clear: 
protect American borders from a hostile and aggrandizing neighbor. While commerce 
was extremely important, the issue allowed Jefferson a less offensive pretext for his 
position on Saint Domingue. The American position would have been less politically 
tenable if Jefferson explicitly stated that its goal was the prevention of French control of 
Louisiana. Jefferson deserves credit for this careful balancing act. Pinchon and Leclerc 
became increasingly aware of France's precarious position. They realized that it was now 
their responsibility not to initiate a break in relations with the United States. Pinchon 
wrote to Leclerc that "the first pretext for a rupture would cause us to be driven out of 
Louisiana before we even took possession of it."110 They had the unenviable task of
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protecting French interests in Saint Domingue and Louisiana while acting as a parry 
against American interests in the same regions.
Success
American merchants continued to trade with Saint Domingue even after Leclerc's 
arrival, and this trade continued to be the main source of friction between the United 
States and France in 1802. Throughout 1802 a clear pattern developed; American 
merchants continued to supply Toussaint, and French soldiers continued to die of yellow 
fever. Even though Leclerc's troops were consistently defeating Toussaint, they were 
losing men faster than they were winning battles. By April, five thousand French troops 
were dead, five thousand were in the hospital, and seven thousand were active.111 
American merchants seemed almost oblivious to the carnage and to the race of those with 
whom they traded. One trader even commented than he did not care "whether he carried
119on trade with black, yellow, or white men."
Despite French difficulties in Saint Domingue, Jefferson was becoming 
increasingly anxious about Louisiana. His famous letter to Robert Livingston in April, 
1802 left no doubt as to Jefferson's position: "There is on the globe one single spot, the 
possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which 
the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market." Jefferson went on to 
say that with Spain in possession of Louisiana, "her feeble state" limited any threat that 
Spain posed. Moreover, the time would come when "circumstance might arise which 
might make the cession of it to [the United States] the price of something of more worth
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to her." France, however, posed a much greater threat and the likelihood of cession by 
France to the United States was minimal: "The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and 
restlessness of her character . . . render it impossible that France and the U.S. can 
continue friends when they meet in so imitable a position . . .  From that moment we must 
marry ourselves to the British fleet."113 It is likely that Jefferson never elucidated a 
policy goal so clearly as he did in this letter to Livingston. In short, the United States 
needed to possess New Orleans and was willing to go to extraordinary means, even by 
going to the British, to get it.
Jefferson suggested to Livingston that if France would cede the Floridas and New 
Orleans to the United States, it would ameliorate tensions between the United States and 
France. However, the question of Saint Domingue was still linked in Jefferson's mind to 
Louisiana. Such an accession by France "would at any rate relieve us from the necessity 
of taking immediate measures for countervailing such an operation by arrangements in 
another quarter."114 Undoubtedly, this other "quarter" meant Saint Domingue. Jefferson 
did not want to have to help the slave revolt-turned revolution, but he would protect 
American interests above at all costs. Believing that the troops sent to Saint Domingue 
were eventually bound for Louisiana, Jefferson's only hope was to delay them by illicitly 
supporting Toussaint with food, supplies, and arms.
However, Jefferson's policies toward Saint Domingue were causing domestic 
nervousness. The fear of slave insurrections was rampant throughout many southeastern 
states. Plans for slave insurrections were discovered in North Carolina and Virginia that 
were assumed to be connected to Saint Domingue. Jefferson himself wrote to Rufus 
Kang about these difficulties: "The course of things in the neighboring islands of the West
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Indies appears to have given a considerable impulse to the minds of the slaves in the 
different parts of the United states. A great disposition to insurgency has manifested 
itself among them."115 As during the earlier debates on the "Toussaint clause," many 
southern Republicans were calling for Jefferson to support the complete restoration of 
French sovereignty so that their property might be safe from "infection."116 The fact that 
Jefferson still pursued a foreign policy of national and not sectional interest illustrated 
that he was not captive to his racism and fears of slave rebellion. Because he had so 
clearly defined the national interests, Jefferson was able to prioritize successfully his 
foreign policy goals.
During the summer of 1802, events in Saint Domingue took an unexpected turn. 
Toussaint Louverture was arrested and deported in chains to France. Despite the loss of  ^
their dynamic leader, the black Haitians’ resolve never faltered. Leclerc proclaimed, "To 
have been rid of Toussaint is not enough; there are two thousand more leaders to get rid 
of as well."117 By the fall, Leclerc was losing one hundred men a day to yellow fever and 
was weakened further by significant defections despite successes on the battlefield. 
Jefferson's delay tactics were paying off. Leclerc wrote to Napoleon, "Saint Domingue is 
lost for France if I have not received at the end of January ten thousand men sent at one 
time."118 In light of France's precarious position in the fall of 1802, Spain's decree of 
October 16 that revoked the United States' right of deposit in New Orleans had fortuitous 
timing for Jefferson and Madison. Nine days later came the order of transfer of 
Louisiana to France from Spain. Napoleon must have thought that the reinforcements 
that he was planning to send to Saint Domingue were going to be adequate.
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Jefferson also knew that only France's difficulties in Saint Domingue were 
preventing a national crisis for the United States. He wrote to Madison in November 
1802, "St. Domingo delays [France] taking possession of Louisiana, and they are in the 
last distress for money for current purposes."119 Nevertheless, the revocation of the right 
of deposit forced Jefferson to finally act, and he hurriedly sent James Monroe to France 
as minister plenipotentiary to negotiate the sale of New Orleans and the Floridas to the 
United States. Jefferson viewed this sale as so vital to the national interest that he wrote 
to Monroe in January 1803 saying if his mission should fail, "it may be necessary to cross 
the channel." Jefferson was willing to break his primary foreign policy goal that he 
stated at the very beginning to his Presidency—not getting involved in European 
"interests and politics"—to secure New Orleans. It must have been particularly onerous 
for Jefferson knowing that he would have to seek Britain's help. Jefferson further 
elaborated on the consequences should Monroe fail: "We shall get entangled in European 
politics and figuring more, be much less happy and prosperous. This can only be
190  •prevented by a successful issue to your present mission." If taken in conjunction with 
his earlier letter to Livingston about New Orleans, one can easily discern Jefferson's 
sense of urgency.
He concluded his letter to Monroe saying "the moment is critical in France." 
Jefferson's analysis was deft. Jefferson knew of Napoleon's need for money and of his 
difficulties in Saint Domingue. If the sale was to be made, the time was now. Pinchon 
wrote to Talleyrand that same month with an equally accurate analysis of France's 
position:
Our colonies cannot at any time exist without the friendship of the United States . . . [France]
could occupy and hold Louisiana only with the greatest regard for the wishes of the United States .
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. . We are dependent on her in time of peace and at her mercy at the first outbreak of war with 
England.121
Both Jefferson and Pinchon had sound logic. As France and England moved closer 
towards war once again, Napoleon must have found such logic increasingly persuasive 
because on April 30, 1803 he sold the entire Louisiana territory to the United States for 
fifteen million dollars. On May 12th, France declared war on Britain.
Conclusion
Two Questions of Credit
From an American perspective, Jefferson’s Saint Domingue policy was a 
resounding success. Although he did not acquire the Floridas, the acquisition of the 
entire Louisiana territory, including New Orleans, is arguably the greatest triumph in 
American diplomacy—the consequences of which are beyond the scope of this study and 
would be needlessly covered here. However, by seamlessly connecting Jefferson's Saint 
Domingue policy with his Louisiana policy, the historian can get a better grasp on the 
amount of credit Jefferson deserved for the acquisition of Louisiana. While it was true 
that the immediate circumstances that led to the sale of Louisiana, France's imminent war 
with England and the conflict in Saint Domingue, were totally out of Jefferson's control, 
Jefferson skillfully used diplomacy to arrive at the position in which he was able to buy 
Louisiana. Jefferson's calculated willingness to supply Toussaint and his successors, his 
refusal to bow to the interests of slaveholders and to his own racial fears, his refusal to 
aid the country to whom he had been most friendly, and most impressively, his ability to 
avoid a "rupture" with France throughout the entire affair illustrate that Jefferson and his 
administration played an incalculable role in the success of the Louisiana purchase.
Was the only possible outcome of Jefferson's Saint Domingue policy the sale of 
Louisiana? Unlikely. Jefferson had no control over the oncoming of war between France 
and Britain nor over the mosquitoes in Saint Domingue. However, would the sale of 
Louisiana have occurred without Jefferson's Saint Domingue policy? Definitely not.
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American aid was unquestionably crucial in the success of Toussaint before and after 
Leclerc's expedition. Moreover, the idea of aiding France to quell a potentially 
dangerous slave rebellion and to prevent the creation of a free black state in the 
Caribbean could not exactly have been repulsive to Jefferson considering his rhetoric of 
the 1790s. During the Washington administration, Jefferson had actively promoted 
aiding France to suppress the revolt. Jefferson was able to defeat these interests, both 
personal and external, because he clearly defined the national interest.
What should not be missed was the fact that Jefferson's Saint Domingue policy 
was not a great departure from that of his predecessors. The only thing from which it was 
a departure was his own previous recommendations. Washington and Adams both 
wanted to maintain the status quo in regards to Saint Domingue. All three
administrations sought to maintain American trade with Saint Domingue and control the 
social and political ramifications of the Haitian Revolution. As late as 1802, Jefferson 
was still trying to maintain the status quo when he proposed to Pinchon that France 
should declare Saint Domingue nominally independent and the United States, Britain, 
and France should share responsibility for "containing" the blacks. Jefferson only broke 
with this policy once France threatened Louisiana and Spain revoked the right of deposit.
Furthermore, Jefferson's aid to Toussaint and the other black revolutionaries was 
hardly new either. Arguably, Adams did more to aid Toussaint Louverture militarily and 
logistically that Jefferson ever did. Without the help of the American navy in 1799, 
Toussaint may never have defeated Rigaud. Taken into a larger context, if Washington 
had forbidden trade with Saint Domingue during his terms in office, which was not an 
unthinkable possibility either, practically all external supplies to the black revolutionaries
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would have been cut off. In short, the geopolitical position in which Jefferson found 
himself in relation to Saint Domingue was largely the result of the policies of his 
predecessors. For these reasons, Jefferson’s success in Louisiana cannot be separated 
from Washington's and Adam's Saint Domingue policies. Jefferson would never have 
had the opportunity to purchase Louisiana if Washington or Adams had closed trade with 
Saint Domingue or if Adams had failed to aid Toussaint. To be sure, Washington and 
Adams were hardly overt supporters of Haitian nationalism, and they often expressed 
their ire about the possibility of an independent Haiti. The fact that their policies aided 
Toussaint and the rebelling blacks was often a side effect of their other objectives, 
whether it was the maintenance of commerce or to protect national security. 
Nevertheless, the fact remained that these policies were highly advantageous to the black 
revolutionaries.
American successes in Saint Domingue and Louisiana were due to effective 
realist policies of national interest as pursued by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson. 
Their policies hardly looked like those recommended by the Model Treaty, but rather 
they were examples of Americans beating the European powers at their own game of 
complex, international, and entangling diplomacy. Credit should be given to all three 
administrations for maintaining distinctly an American position, defending American 
interests, and, with the exception of the Quasi-War, generally staying out of a European 
war. All three presidents exploited the United States’ favorable trade position to gain 
concessions from France and England, expanded and secured trade in the Caribbean, and 
sought to minimize the threat to slavery posed by the Haitian Revolution. However, 
despite the initial success, after Haiti declared independence in 1804, the United States’
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trade with Haiti atrophied to only just over three percent of total American exports, or 
1.32 million dollars, by 1821 after reaching a high of fifteen percent in 1800.122 
Furthermore, 1.32 million dollars in exports was a tenfold increase from the total a 
decade earlier.123 Jefferson’s trade embargo, the War of 1812 with England, and 
American prejudice destroyed the gains in trade made in the late 1790s and early 1800s. 
The United States could accept Saint Domingue—a colony in revolt against its European 
masters. It could not accept Haiti—a republic of black former slaves.
The primary strategy to achieve these goals was to promote the status quo of 
nominal French control over Saint Domingue while preventing the island from becoming 
a French (or British for that matter) military staging point. Napoleon’s ambition to regain 
France’s New World empire drastically changed Jefferson’s tactics, not his goals. The 
acquisition of Louisiana achieved two goals. First, it prevented the establishment of a 
potentially dangerous and unpredictable European power on the United States’ 
indefensible western border. Second, it made the reconquest of Saint Domingue 
unnecessary because it was no longer needed as a staging point for the occupation of 
Louisiana.
The other question of credit deals with Haitian independence. While the 
acquisition of Louisiana was a major triumph for the United States, France did not 
magically withdraw its troops from Haiti upon the sale. The sale of Louisiana was 
essentially irrelevant to the black troops fighting in Saint Domingue. In fact, the first half 
of 1803 was an extremely difficult time for the black revolutionaries. Although Leclerc 
had died of yellow fever the previous November, his troops, now under the command of 
Rochambeau, were mostly acclimated and ready to conduct a war of extermination. By
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the beginning of April 1803, Toussaint had died a prisoner in France and Napoleon was 
preparing to send thirty thousand reinforcements.124 However, the declaration of war 
between France and England was extremely relevant to the black revolutionaries. Just as 
French troops were beginning to make significant progress in Saint Domingue, British 
ships surrounded the island in a total blockade, which not even American ships were 
willing to challenge. By the end of June, Rochambeau and his troops were cut off from 
France and from the help of the French navy. Aided by the British navy, black troops 
under Dessalines conquered the costal towns and eventually moved through the island's 
interior, destroying all French opposition. On December 31, 1803, Dessalines announced 
the Haitian Declaration of Independence.
Haitian independence was guaranteed by the British victories at Trafalgar and 
Waterloo. Never again would France, under any leader, have the energy or the resources 
for a reconquest of Haiti. The world would have to live with the creation of a free and 
independent black republic. Many factors contributed to the success of the Haitians. In 
the immediate sense, the British blockade and military aid secured the Haitian victory. 
Rayford Logan credited the blockade, the valor of the black troops in Saint Domingue, 
Jefferson's "wait and see" policy, and yellow fever as the primary reasons for the success 
of the Haitians.125 This study adds two more things to that list. The first is not 
adequately covered here, but without the leadership of Toussaint Louverture Haitian 
nationalism would probably not have survived the late 1790s. His skill not only as a 
military leader and administrator but also as a diplomat crystallized the energies of the 
Haitian Revolution into a viable force. Like Jefferson, he manipulated a given set of 
circumstances to his advantage, as he illustrated in the Maitland Treaty and in the
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Tripartite Treaty with the United States and England. Considering his limited resources, 
his accomplishments are all the more remarkable. The second item to add to Logan's list 
is once again the policies of Washington and Adams. Their support during the 1790s 
provided a lifeline to the black revolutionaries and to Toussaint once he gained power. 
Unknowingly, they contributed to the creation of an independent Haiti. Without these 
policies in the 1790s, Toussaint would not have had the necessary resources to combat 
his rivals or the French, and Jefferson would not have been able to purchase Louisiana, 
which drastically decreased the value of reconquering Saint Domingue.
Epilogue-Reflections for Further Study
The United States foreign relations’ with Haiti did not end with the sale of 
Louisiana or with the Haitian Declaration of Independence. Jefferson continued to 
promote trade with Haiti even after independence, much to the dismay of his southern 
colleagues. The ramifications of the success of the Haitian revolution were indeed 
profound. Some historians have compared the shock in the white slaveholding world of 
watching the creation of a republic of former slaves to the effect of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia in 1917. Ironically, despite the vast amount of American aid to the 
revolutionaries during the revolution itself, the United States never recognized the 
Republic of Haiti until 1862, when the United States was itself going through a 
revolution over its own national identity.
As the nineteenth century progressed and as sectionalism began to polarize the 
United States, the meaning of the Haitian Revolution became much more controversial. 
Was the racial struggle in the United States to follow the path of Haiti? Haiti had 
achieved its independence in a very similar manner as the United States. With the 
tremendous help of foreign powers, it had defeated one of the most powerful nations in 
the world and thrown off the chains of colonialism (and slavery). The similarities were 
remarkable. Why then would the United States not recognize Haiti until the Civil War? 
Thomas Hart Benton gave the best answer when he testified before the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs in 1825:
We purchase coffee from her [Haiti] and pay for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers. 
We receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors from her; and why? Because the peace of 
eleven States in this Union will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be 
exhibited among them. It will not permit black consuls or ambassadors to establish themselves in 
our cities, and to parade through out the country, and to give their fellow-blacks in the United
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States proof in the hands of honors that await them in a like successful effort on their part. It will 
not permit the fact to be seen and told, that for the murder of their masters and mistresses they are 
to find friends among the white people of the United States.126
The success of the Haitian Revolution was at all costs to be kept from the shores of the 
United States. For some, the recognition of Haiti would have unnecessarily disturbed the 
growing rift in the United States between North and South. For others in all parts of the 
country, recognition of Haiti was antithetical to their racist precepts. Surely no 
government by blacks could be legitimate. Most importantly, to recognize Haiti would 
have been to recognize the fact that a slave revolt could succeed. As pro-slavery 
ideology developed in the South, recognition would have been a repudiation of the 
doctrine of slavery as a positive good.
The effect of slavery upon foreign policy lasted long after the end of the Haitian 
Revolution, and the examination of which belongs in another study. However, the United 
States' foreign policy during the Haitian Revolution should play a large part of such a 
study. Washington, Adams, and Jefferson each took slavery into account when 
formulating their foreign policy towards Saint Domingue. It is a tribute to all three that 
the interests of slavery did not yet dominate the national interests and that their foreign 
policies did not reflect slavery's dominance. Commerce, national security, and empire 
each took priority. Albeit reluctantly and at times unwittingly, Washington, Adams, and 
Jefferson contributed to the success of the modem world's most significant slave 
rebellion.
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